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1 
Dead Contractors: 
The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the  
Public’s Casualty Sensitivity 
Steven L. Schooner and Collin D. Swan** 
Casualty sensitivity may be thought of as price sensitivity to the 
human cost of war.1   
We’re simply not going to go to war without contractors. We have 
to build that into what we call readiness, what we call training, 
what we call leadership and what we call war planning.2 
I.  THE PRICE OF WAR 
In a representative democracy, few decisions are more significant or 
heavily scrutinized than the decision to engage in heavy, sustained, military 
action abroad.3 Once the nation commits to an operation, decisions 
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 1. Christopher Gelpi & John Mueller, The Cost of War: How Many Casualties Will 
Americans Tolerate?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 139. 
 2. Statement of Ashton B. Carter, Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Tech. & 
Logistics, before the Comm’n on Wartime Contracting: Better Buying Power in Defense 
Spending 39 (Mar. 28, 2011) (oral testimony), available at http://www.wartime 
contracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-03-28_transcript.pdf.  The authors discussed an earlier 
version of this paper at a forum of the Commission on Wartime Contracting.  See Public 
Forum, COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING (May 2, 2011), http://www.wartime 
contracting.gov/index.php/hearings/publicforum.  On August 31, 2011, the Commission 
released their Final Report to Congress.  See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & 
AFG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 30 
(2011), available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf 
[hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT]. 
 3. There has been much debate over the years concerning the proper role that 
Congress and the executive should play in the decision to engage in military operations.  See, 
e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DECIDING TO USE FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS IN A 
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regarding how long to remain are hotly debated. Public support for 
sustained military engagements, especially those involving long-term 
deployment of ground forces, is scrupulously observed and dissected.4  
Within this complicated calculus,5 several significant factors determine 
whether the public will support these operations. The most graphic is the 
number of soldiers who have died on the nation’s behalf.  Indeed, in the 
absence of a strong national imperative or a widely-held belief in the 
operation’s success, the total number of American fatalities becomes the 
most quantifiable and readily accessible metric of public interest.  Most 
recent studies suggest that “[m]ajorities of the public have historically 
considered the potential and actual casualties in U.S. wars and military 
operations to be an important factor in their support.”6  Specifically, an 
inverse relationship exists between the number of military deaths and public 
support.7  Economists have dubbed this the “casualty sensitivity” effect.8 
 
SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES (2005), available at http://www.constitution 
project.org/pdf/War_Powers_Deciding_To_Use_Force_Abroad.pdf.  For the war-related 
powers of Congress and the President, see U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall 
have Power . . . To declare War, [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . ); U.S. 
Const., art. II, §2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States . . . ”). 
 4. See, e.g., ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH, RAND CORPORATION, MG-231-A, 
AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD 1 
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG231.html [hereinafter 
LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD]: 
While anecdotal evidence suggests that public opinion is not a dominant factor in 
decisions on whether or not to undertake military operations, there is ample 
evidence that the public opinion environment shapes the way military operations 
are justified and even, in some cases, the way they are designed and conducted.   
 5. See ERIC V. LARSON, RAND CORPORATION, MR-726-RC, CASUALTIES AND 
CONSENSUS: THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF CASUALTIES IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR U.S. 
MILITARY OPERATIONS  iii (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_ 
reports/MR726.html [hereinafter LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS]: 
The relationship between U.S. casualties and public opinion on military operations 
remains an important yet greatly misunderstood issue.  It is now an article of faith 
in political and media circles that the American public will no longer accept 
casualties in U.S. military operations and that casualties inexorably lead to 
irresistible calls for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. 
 6. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at xv.  It is not uncommon 
for government officials to justify military engagements to the public through statements that 
“no ground troops” will be used. In fact, the lack of committed ground forces may explain 
why the public remains largely unconcerned about brief, surgical insertions, such as the 
nation’s current military involvement in Libya.  Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
has affirmatively pledged that there will not be any U.S. ground forces sent to Libya “”See 
Gates: No U.S. Ground Troops in Libya on His Watch, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-03-31-gates-mullen-libya_N.htm. 
 7. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that “the rate of 
decline [in support] as a function of casualties varies dramatically from operation to 
operation.”).  As discussed below, there is also the perception of a counter-conventional 
reaction – a form of inflammation – in which fatalities lead to a demand for escalation (or 
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This article asserts that this stark and monolithic metric requires re-
examination in light of a little-known phenomenon: On the modern 
battlefield, contractor personnel are dying at rates similar to – and at times 
in excess of  – soldiers.  As their role in governance and defense expands, 
contractors increasingly experience risks to their health and well-being. The 
post-millennial U.S. military, like the modern U.S. government, is more 
heterogeneous than ever before.  In every conceivable aspect of missions 
abroad, the U.S. military is populated by a “blended workforce” that 
integrates soldiers with private-sector contractors – comprised of both U.S. 
citizens and foreign nationals.  Not surprisingly, one result of this 
integration is that contractors are dying alongside – or in the place of – 
soldiers at unprecedented and (arguably) alarming rates. For the most part, 
this “substitution” has taken place beyond the cognizance of the public and, 
potentially, Congress.9 This article examines this phenomenon, identifies 
some of the challenges and complexities associated with quantifying and 
qualifying casualty rates in this modern outsourced military, and 
encourages greater transparency10 so that the public can more meaningfully 
participate11 in democratic debate, “the great American experiment.”12 
 
greater resolve) to achieve victory. Id. at 53. 
 8. See Christopher Gelpi et al., Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in 
Iraq, 30 INT’L SEC., no. 3, 2006, at 7, available at http://www.mitpress journals.org/doi/ 
pdf/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.7 (indicating that “[s]ince the Vietnam War, policymakers have 
worried that the U.S. public will support military operations only if the human costs of the 
war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal.”). 
 9. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 753-757 
(2010).  Professor Michaels addresses the political benefits of relying on a large contractor 
presence: 
Private contractors are politically valuable insofar as they neither enter into official 
head or body counts – nor, it appears, into our hearts.  That is to say, the nation 
identifies with its troops to a far greater extent than its contractors: “Americans are 
accustomed to hearing the military death toll.  But largely absent from the public 
consciousness are the thousands of civilians putting their lives on the line as 
contractors in Iraq.”  Combining US military personnel and contractors in combat 
zones thus allows for contractors to lighten the troops’ share of long tours, injuries, 
and other physical and emotional hardships.  But even more importantly, the 
aggregate loss of life (and quality of life) is discounted by the fact that we neither 
hear as much about nor, evidently, care as much about homesick or fallen 
contractors. 
Id. at 754-755 (quoting Marego Athans, To Make A Living, Driver Risked It All, BALT. SUN 
1A (Feb. 8, 2004). 
 10. Since early in his Administration, President Barack Obama has emphasized the 
linkage between transparency and the government’s accountability to the public.  See 
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 4 (Jan. 21, 2009) (“A 
democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency. As Justice 
Louis Brandeis wrote, ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.’”). 
 11. LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR & PEACE 104-105 (2011).  Dickinson 
introduces her chapter on “Public Participation/Private Contract” by explaining, among other 
things, that: 
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II.  A MODERN, UNANTICIPATED ROLE FOR CONTRACTORS 
In past decades, enlisted personnel cut grass, peeled potatoes, and 
carried out most defense services.  Today, with a smaller all-
volunteer force, many of these services are now contracted out.13 
The extraordinary growth in the government’s reliance on service 
contractors in the last two decades is well documented,14 and the 
outsourcing phenomenon has generated scholarly debate about the 
 
Public participation has long been a central preoccupation of administrative 
law. . . . [M]uch of domestic administrative law is concerned with increasing 
public awareness, participation, and oversight through . . . the Freedom of 
Information Act. . . , the Federal Advisory Committee Act, inspector-general 
oversight, whistleblower protection statutes, . . . notice and comment rule making, 
judicial review . . . , and even the First Amendment.  Significantly, . . . public 
participation is not simply about making sure a voting polity ratifies all 
government decisions.  Rather, [public participation] is concerned with ensuring 
that there is some sort of dialogue, even if informal, between the government and 
the governed to act as a check on power. . . .  In this scheme, transparency is . . . 
an end in itself and . . . [it] helps to maintain a feedback loop between government 
actors and those affected by government policy. . . . 
Id. at 105-106 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).  See also Cary Coglianese et al., 
Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: 
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 927 (2009) 
(“Not only will transparency and public participation inevitably help to achieve democratic 
goals, but they also can help produce better, more informed policy decisions.”); Cary 
Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational 
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 335 (2004) (pointing out to 
the government the Sunshine Act’s declaration that “the policy of the United States [is] that 
the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decision-making 
processes of the Federal Government” (quoting Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §552b (2000)))). 
 12. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). 
 13. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., AND LOGISTICS, 
REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICES 
CONTRACTING 31 (2011), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2011-05-
Services.pdf [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING]. 
 14. Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? 
Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. OF CONT. MGMT. 10 (2008); see also 
PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC 
MANAGERS (2003); MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND 
DOWNSIDE (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); THE PROCUREMENT 
REVOLUTION (Mark A. Abramson & Roland S. Harris III eds., 2003) (particularly chapters 1, 
3, and 5-7); Collin D. Swan, Note, Dead Letter Prohibitions and Policy Failures: Applying 
Government Ethics Standards to Personal Service Contractors, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (noting that service contractors are increasingly performing functions 
that are indistinguishable from those performed by their federal counterparts).  Symposia 
have grappled with a host of related issues.  See, e.g., Accountability and Democracy in the 
Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001); New Forms of Governance: 
Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Privatization and 
Outsourcing, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 551 (2001); Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003). 
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implications for governments and governance.15  According to the recent 
report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group, the professional services contracting industry 
that serves the federal government has expanded at a rate of five percent 
annually over the last fifteen years, from $137 billion in 1994 to $280 
billion in 2009.16  The Department of Defense (DoD) remains the largest 
federal government consumer of professional services, having spent over 
 
 15. Scholars also have exposed more of the thorny issues implicated when 
governments, at the federal, state, and local levels, rely on the private sector.  See, e.g., 
Roger Fairfax, Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal Justice 
Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266 (“[T]he prosecutorial function . . . is being 
outsourced to private lawyers in smaller jurisdictions . . . and [t]his phenomenon is poised to 
expand as larger jurisdictions are forced to slash already tight law enforcement budgets.”) 
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000) (discussing 
accountability mechanisms in contracts and the conflict between public law norms and 
private law principles); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1371 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law’s current approach to privatization is 
fundamentally inadequate in an era of increasingly privatized government.”); Sydney A. 
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (noting that 
governments employ a transaction cost or make-or-buy analysis in determining whether to 
outsource governmental regulation); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: 
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 130 (2003) (“[I]n the debate about 
which government services are best-suited for private enterprise, . . . welfare services should 
be among the last in line. The policy goals are simply too complex and, in a democratic 
society, conflicted.”).  A wealth of contemporary comparative scholarship also examines 
lessons learned from experiences outside the United States.  See, e.g., Lauren Page 
Ambinder et al., The Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance 
Developments in the Middle East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029 (2001); 
Alessandro Ancarani, The Impact of Public Firms Commercialisation on Purchasing 
Management, 3 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 357 (2003); Bernard Black et al., Russian 
Privatization & Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000); 
Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60 
MD. L. REV. 249, 249 n.a1 (2001) (see author’s biographical footnote for sources relating to 
privatization in New Zealand); Hester Lessard, The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental 
Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring, 39 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 717 (2001); 
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 75 (2001); Tony Prosser, Public Service Law: Privatization’s Unexpected 
Offspring, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2000); Yua Wei, Corporatization and 
Privatization: A Chinese Perspective, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 219 (2002).  The newly-
reformed Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) issued a Final 
Recommendation on June 17, 2011, calling for the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) 
Council to promulgate language that addresses the increasing risk of personal conflicts of 
interest among service contractors.  See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-3, COMPLIANCE STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES – PERSONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND USE OF CERTAIN NON-
PUBLIC INFORMATION 12-13 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/research/the-
conference-current-projects/government-contractor-ethics/.  
 16. GREGORY SANDERS ET AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, STRUCTURE 
AND DYNAMICS OF THE U.S. FEDERAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INDUSTRIAL BASE 1995-2009 
at ix (2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/101112_fps_report_2010.pdf.  All 
dollar values in this report were converted to FY 2009 dollars.  See id. at 3. 
DEAD CONTRACTORS [POST]  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2012  3:46 PM 
6 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 5:N 
$162 billion on service contracts in 2009.17  One major consequence of this 
expansion is that federal government contractors are now heavily involved 
in our nation’s operations abroad.18  There may be no more significant 
indicator of the scope of this involvement than the frequency with which 
contractor personnel are now being asked to make the ultimate sacrifice in 
what, until recently, would have been described as “the battle area.”19 
 
 17. Id. at 8.  According to the Defense Science Board Task Force: 
Contracts for services are essential to all aspects of military operations.  
Contracted services to support Department of Defense (DOD) missions range from 
routine base operating support to highly skilled analysis to direct support to 
battlefield operations.  Contracts for services supporting major DOD programs and 
their associated administrative, technological, and logistics services are a strategic 
component of the expanding expeditionary military, stability, and reconstruction 
operations.  The reduction in the number of uniformed personnel in the 1990s, and 
today’s demanding combat missions have resulted in the expansion of services 
contracting to more than $200 billion – over 50 percent of the DOD acquisition 
budget.  Today, almost every defense task that is not an inherently governmental 
function is carried out in some part through contracted services. 
IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at vii (emphasis added). 
 18. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., AT WHAT RISK? 
CORRECTING OVER-RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 7 (2011), 
available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf 
[hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?] (quoting the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in its description of the “wide range of services” that 
contractors perform: “They guard bases and diplomatic facilities, escort convoys and 
personnel, wash clothes and serve meals, maintain equipment and translate local languages, 
erect buildings and dig wells, and support many other important activities.”).  See also 
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19.  The 
CENTCOM census has grouped the contractor community into the following categories: 
base support, security, communication, construction, translator/interpreter, logistics/ 
maintenance, transportation, training, and “other.”  See Moshe Schwartz & Joyprada Swain, 
Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis 
(Cong. Research Serv. R40764), May 13, 1011, at 13-15, 24-25, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. 
 19. Modern engagements and the use of non-traditional military forces in the past 
decade have blurred the geographical limits of the “battlefield.”  As a result, fatalities are no 
longer conveniently confined to specific geographical areas.  In fact, the diffuse nature of the 
modern battlefield is a major focus in recent scholarship on the United States’ War on 
Terror.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2117 (2005) (“Two controversial issues 
about the detention power as it applies to terrorists concern the geographic scope of the 
authorized conflict and the allowable length of detention for captured enemy combatants.”). 
Sophia Brill, The National Security Court We Already Have, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 525, 
536 (2010);“”.  We make no attempt in this piece to distinguish between “war” and military 
conflicts on the “battlefield.”  The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are not  “wars” 
in the legal sense, as they lack of a formal declaration of war by Congress.  See U.S. Const. 
art. 1 §8(11).  Thus, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applied, “[in] time 
of war, [to] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field,” 10 U.S.C. 
§802(a)(10) (2000),  originally could not be applied to military contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the absence of a Congressional war declaration.  See Michael J. Davidson, 
Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the 
Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 239 (2000).  In an attempt to overcome this 
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On the modern battlefield, the ratio of troops to contractors has never 
been lower.  While the number of contractors employed by the military has 
varied from conflict to conflict, historically, the ratio of contractors to 
troops averaged around one-to-six.20  The last decade witnessed the U.S. 
government’s first sustained operations where contractors consistently 
outnumbered troops in the battle space (with the exception of the 
engagement in Bosnia in the mid-1990s).21  What separates the current 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan from previous wars is the sheer 
pervasiveness of contractors.22  While hard data remains elusive, most 
experts concede that, in recent years, up to 200,000 contractor personnel 
have supported the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan at any given time, a 
number that frequently exceeded military personnel.23  Correspondingly, 
evidence indicates that contractor fatalities on the battlefield have never 
been higher. 
As the military assigns more contractors to perform dangerous-yet-vital 
tasks, contractors are inevitably bearing a larger portion of the casualty rate.  
Cumulatively, contractor deaths account for nearly thirty percent of total 
losses since the United States entered Iraq and Afghanistan.24  But even that 
dramatic figure understates the extent to which – in the last two-to-three 
years – contractors have increasingly absorbed the most significant cost of 
our military actions.  By continuing to outsource high-risk jobs that were 
previously performed by soldiers, the military, in effect, is privatizing the 
ultimate sacrifice. 
Of course, we do not mean to assert, nor do we assume, that the 
government is intentionally exploiting this substitution effect25 to its 
 
jurisdictional problem, Congress amended the UCMJ in 2006 by replacing “war” with 
“declared war or a contingency operation.”  John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (codified 
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10) (2006)). 
 20. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFG., AT WHAT COST? 
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 20-22 (2009), available at 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-10-
09.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT COST?]. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id.  Of course, a number of other variables undoubtedly influence the 
pervasiveness of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the prolonged length and 
simultaneity of the conflicts, weak international support, and declining enlistment numbers 
in the U.S. military. 
 23. See id.; SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at 5-6; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. CENTCOM AREA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN (2010), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ 
PS/hot_topics.html.       
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79. 
 25. According to economic theory, the “substitution effect” is the relationship between 
a drop in price of a good and a buyer’s decision to buy more of that good relative to other 
higher-priced goods.  In essence, price changes induce the buyer to purchase lower-priced 
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advantage.  Nothing suggests that senior military planners conspired to use 
contractors on the battlefield as a means of reducing the troop casualty rate.  
At the same time, this will not prove a fleeting experience.  Nothing 
indicates that DoD will be able to reduce its reliance on contractors in the 
near future.  On the contrary, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 
recently announced plans to reduce the number of Army and Marine ground 
forces by as many as 27,000 troops within the next three years.26  On 
February 1, 2011, Army Secretary John M. McHugh suspended the Army’s 
current effort to in-source work from contractors and subjected all future 
insourcing proposals to rigorous review.27  Neither will the Department of 
State reduce its reliance on contractors.  In the summer of 2010, the State 
Department came under fire for awarding a $120 million contract to Xe 
Services – formerly, Blackwater – after the high-profile Nissour Square 
incident prompted the company’s expulsion from Iraq.28  As the State 
Department prepared to take over the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq, 
James F. Jeffery, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, testified in early 2011 that he 
 
goods as a “substitute” for higher-priced goods.  See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR 
LAWYERS 23 (2005).  For the purposes of this article, we suggest that the increase in 
contractor (or surrogate) deaths – which, for a host of reasons, fall outside of the public’s 
cognizance – decreases the “price” of war-fighting, in terms of military deaths, thus 
distorting (or “increasing”) public support for contingency operations. 
 26. Karen Parrish, DOD Directs Army, Marine Drawdowns for 2015, 2016, American 
Forces Press Service (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle. 
aspx?ID=62355. 
 27. Memorandum from John M. McHugh, Sec’y of the Army, on Reservation of In-
Sourcing Approval Authority (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.govexec. 
com/pdfs/020311rb2.pdf: 
[E]ffective the date of this directive, I reserve to myself the authority to approve 
any in-sourcing proposal, wherever generated across the Army. Any in-sourcing 
proposal presented for my consideration must be fully documented and justified. 
Any proposal will include, at minimum, a manpower requirements determination, 
an analysis of all potential alternatives to the establishment of permanent civilian 
authorizations to perform the contracted work, certification of fund availability and 
a comprehensive legal review. 
 28. See Jeff Stein, Blackwater Deal Puts Officials on Hot Seat, WASH. POST (June 21, 
2010: 6:40PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/06/blackwater_deal_ 
puts_officials.html.  During that same summer, the Central Intelligence Agency also 
awarded up to $600 million in contracts to Blackwater subsidiaries.  See James Risen & 
Mark Mazzeti, 30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04blackwater.html.  That the 
government is still awarding contracts to a company with a severely damaged public 
reputation indicates that the government is either incredibly tone-deaf to public perception or 
highly dependent on contractors.  The D.C. Circuit, in a unanimous decision issued in April 
2011, reinstated criminal suits against four Blackwater employees involved in the September 
2007 Nissour Square shootings.  See United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 
2011).  The District Court judge, Ricardo M. Urbina, had previously dismissed the 
indictments on the grounds that the defendants’ statements to Diplomatic Security were 
compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  See United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 
2d 112, 133 (D.D.C. 2009).    
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expected his staff to more than double in size within the coming year, from 
8,000 to 17,000 people; most of that personnel growth will be contractors.29 
This solidifies the assumption that the government’s reliance on 
contractor support – both logistical personnel and private security 
contractors – in contingency settings will continue to increase over the 
long-term.  In other words, contractor personnel will continue to die 
supporting the government’s missions abroad and, more specifically, 
performing tasks that, a generation ago, were performed by members of the 
military.  This article, therefore, seeks to examine how this continued 
dependence on contractors affects the public’s sensitivity to wartime 
casualties. 
III.  CASUALTY SENSITIVITY AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
All of this matters because of the idea, inherent in our democratic 
notions of governance, that public support (or public consent) is critical to 
any successful military action abroad.30  Democratic institutions, such as 
“public opinion, public debate, rallies, and protests” force our 
democratically-elected “leaders [to] either convince the public of the 
necessity of using force or abide by public worries about its costs: in lives, 
financial resources, or opportunities.”31 
For 40 years, policy makers and scholars have widely accepted the 
theory that public support for any given military conflict is inversely related 
to the number of U.S. military casualties suffered in that conflict.  
Economists may not perceive this as rational behavior,32 but the public does 
 
 29. See Walter Pincus, Top Diplomat Defends Size, Cost of State Dept. Presence in 
Iraq, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2011/02/01/AR2011020106176.html; Iraq: The Challenging Transition to a Civilian 
Mission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement 
of James F. Jeffrey, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/ 
imo/media/doc/Jeffrey-Austin_Testimony.pdf. 
 30. But see LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 2 (acknowledging 
that “there . . . are profound differences in beliefs about how representative democracy 
works, specifically the extent to which American political leaders influence, or follow, the 
will of the public.”).  See also DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 104-105.  We agree with the 
proposition that “importing public participation norms into a world of private contracts is an 
underexplored avenue for imposing accountability and constraint.”  Id. at 143. 
 31. Deborah Avant & Lee Sigelman, Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from 
the U.S. in Iraq, 19 SECURITY STUDIES 230, 236-237 (2010) (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, 
POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795)).  Indeed, Avant and Sigelman note that Kant 
distinguished himself from Machiavelli by suggesting that “[b]y involving citizens in 
decisions about war, republics based on freedom, law, and equality could exercise greater 
caution and sometimes avoid the calamities of war.”  Id. at 239-240. 
 32. “The concern about casualties among political leaders and the public, although 
humane, is not entirely rational – U.S. battle deaths are actually somewhat rare, typically 
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not always behave in entirely rational ways.33  John E. Mueller persuasively 
demonstrated this theory in his 1973 book, War, Presidents and Public 
Opinion, by analyzing opinion polls for the Vietnam and Korean Wars in 
connection with their respective casualty rates.34  More broadly, “in 
democracies[,] the standards for using force are said to be higher than 
elsewhere: war must be of great importance to warrant spilling the blood of 
citizens fighting for their country and to subject democratic leaders to 
political consequences when casualties mount.”35  Research suggests that, 
without a clearly defined national imperative for a military operation or a 
general belief in the likelihood of that operation’s success, military 
casualties can greatly influence the public’s support for, or opposition to, 
that operation.36 
The RAND Corporation’s Eric V. Larson, who chronicles public 
opinion polls of military operations, explained that “all else being equal, 
prospective and observed support for a U.S. military intervention [declines] 
as expected or actual casualties increase.”37  But the calculus is more 
complex, and, the most hyperbolic positions may lack empirical support.  
Larson identifies “[t]wo bits of conflicting conventional wisdom[:]” 
The first, . . . more commonly expressed . . . in the national security 
community, has it that, as casualties mount, the public will 
“demand” immediate withdrawal, i.e., U.S. casualties result in an 
inexorable demand to withdraw precipitously from . . . military 
commitment.  The counter-conventional wisdom has it that U.S. 
casualties . . . inflame the American public, resulting in a “demand” 
 
very few, and are dwarfed by the number of deaths to U.S. service personnel from other 
causes.” LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 33. The common assumption held by most economists is that individuals behave 
rationally, at least to some degree.  See, e.g., JOHN P. BURKETT, MICROECONOMICS: 
OPTIMIZATION, EXPERIMENTS, AND BEHAVIOR 3 (2006).  A recent strain of popular economic 
literature is examining some any number of theoretical economic assumptions in common, 
everyday scenarios, often with entertaining, if not enlightening results.  See, e.g., STEVEN D. 
LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS (2005); STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. 
DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS (2009).  See also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 
(2008). 
 34. See JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1973).  Like most 
significant research, Mueller’s work is frequently summarized and over-simplified.  See 
Gelpi, supra note 8, at 11 (“Mueller’s finding does not support the casualty-phobia thesis. 
However, Mueller was arguing that public support dropped reflexively, and more to the 
point, inexorably.  His oft-quoted study thus fixed in the public mind the idea that support 
for Vietnam buckled as the body bag toll mounted, and this gradually hardened into the 
conventional wisdom that the public is reflexively casualty phobic.”). 
 35. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 255 (citing MUELLER, supra note 34). 
 36. See LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 10-12. 
 37. Id. at 7.  One of our colleagues, an Army Judge Advocate, reminded us that, of 
course, things are never really equal.  Accordingly, this effect is not static, and “[s]upport for 
a U.S. military intervention rarely remains at its initial levels and tends to fall over time (and 
as casualties increase).”  Id. at xix. 
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for escalation to a “decisive victory.” . . . [N]either of these extreme 
views is accurate.38 
Nor, Larson implies, are military casualties the only variable affecting 
public support for military operations.  Extrapolating from available public 
opinion data from the last several decades, Larson outlined several 
additional predictors that significantly affect public support, including: (1) 
the importance of the stakes; (2) prospects of success; and (3) partisan 
leadership and “followership.”39 Taking these factors together, Larson 
ultimately concluded that, as the public’s belief in the importance of the 
operation and its prospects for success increased, the more tolerant the 
public became of casualties and other costs.40 
This theory has proved accurate over time and, more recently, when 
applied to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.41  Mueller has argued that 
public support for the war in Iraq has generally followed the same steady 
decline as witnessed in Korea and Vietnam.42  As the administration shifted 
its focus away from Iraq, savage violence and a mounting death toll in 
Afghanistan are souring public support.  While the events of September 11, 
2001 helped to establish a strong national imperative for these operations, 
the public’s belief in their likely success has slowly, but steadily, dwindled.  
“[T]he characteristics of the sort of war we are waging in the [Global War 
on Terror] – mostly in the shadows, with only occasional evidence of 
success – make it a significant challenge to sustain public optimism about 
the outcome.”43  Larson and Begdan Savych caution that “if most 
 
 38. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 39. Id.  For an alternative rubric, see Gelpi, supra note 8, at 14-16.  Gelpi examines a 
number of conditions – many of which can co-exist – under which the number of casualties 
will cause public support to decline more rapidly:  (1) Gelpi cites Bruce Jentleson for the 
proposition that the “pretty prudent” public bases its casualty tolerance on the articulated 
“principal policy objective (PPO)” and asserts greater public acceptance of “foreign policy 
restraint” (FPR) goals.  Id. at 14.  (2) Gelpi discusses Eric Larson’s research in the context of 
an “elite casualty tolerance.”  Id. at 15.  Here, he summarizes that: “when domestic elites are 
divided, even a small number of casualties will quickly diminish public support.”  Id.  (3)  
Gelpi references Steven Kull for the proposition that the engagement of other states matters, 
implying that multilateral support either suggests that a rationale underlies the engagement 
or that the burdens of the military action are being evenly (or even fairly) distributed.  Id.  
Finally, Gelpi and his co-authors point to the public’s expectations for success.  “When the 
public thinks victory is unlikely, even small costs will cause support to plummet.”  Id. at 15-
16. 
 40. See LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5. 
 41. “[T]here has been a great deal of continuity and consistency in the public’s 
response to casualties in wars – including World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf 
Wars – and in smaller operations – including Panama and Somalia.”  Id. at iv. 
 42. John Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 44. For a 
critique of this article by Christopher Gelpi, a political science professor at Duke University, 
followed by a reply from Mueller, see Gelpi & Mueller, supra note 1. 
 43. LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD, supra note 4, at xxiv.  See also 
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Americans were to come to believe that the stakes in Iraq were no more 
important than those in the peace operations of the 1990s, for example, or 
that the situation closely resembled the quagmires of Vietnam, Lebanon, 
and Somalia, remaining support and the willingness to accept casualties 
could quickly erode.”44 
IV.  LAYERS OF COMPLEXITY: DILUTING A SIMPLE NUMBER 
Unfortunately, the raw number of military casualties no longer tells the 
whole story of human sacrifice associated with military actions.  As the 
battlefield becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
discern and provide an accurate tally of the human cost of war; that is, the 
number of troop fatalities can no longer capture the true human cost of 
these operations.45 
For example, in 2004, the New England Journal of Medicine reported 
that advances in Kevlar, body armor, and medevac operations have reduced 
military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan to about ten percent of total 
injuries.46  While that is remarkable, the resulting increase in veterans 
surviving with multiple amputations, brain trauma, devastating burns, and 
other severe injuries has achieved less public attention.47  This development 
has created a whole new set of analytical challenges that government 
programs48 and non-profits, like the Wounded Warrior Project,49 have been 
 
Gelpi, supra note 8, at 25 (“We argue that survey respondents’ tolerance for casualties in the 
war in Iraq is a function of two central explanatory variables: (1) the extent to which they 
believe that President Bush did the right thing in attacking Iraq, and (2) the extent to which 
they believe that the United States will emerge victorious.”). 
 44. LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD, supra note 4, at xxiv-xxv 
(emphasis added). 
 45. While the modern battlefield has certainly become safer for some, it is still 
incredibly dangerous for others.  See infra notes 67 & 68.  Technological advances have also 
enabled the U.S. military to better protect certain warfighters from harm.  See, e.g., Peter W. 
Singer, A Revolution Once More: Unmanned Systems and the Middle East, THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/11_robotic_ 
revolution_singer.aspx.  Nevertheless, the modern battlefield is still a very dangerous place. 
 46. Atul Gawande, Casualties of War – Military Care for the Wounded from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2471 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/ 
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp048317. 
 47. For a particularly sobering account, see DAVID FINKEL, THE GOOD SOLDIERS 
(2009).  The author, a Washington Post writer, chronicles the deployment of an infantry 
battalion during “the Surge” in Baghdad during 2007 and 2008, offering, among other 
things, a window into the medical experiences, rehabilitation, and the future prospects for 
some of the injured survivors. 
 48. For example, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs received from Congress a 
budget of $48 billion in 2010 to provide medical services to veterans.  See CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, POTENTIAL COST OF VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE 2 (October 2010), available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11811/2010_10_7_VA Healthcare_Summary.pdf. 
 49. See About Us, WOUNDED WARRIOR PROJECT, http://www.woundedwarrior 
project.org/content/view/1135/.  
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working to resolve.  Unfortunately, neither the government nor the media 
have afforded the same level of attention to the deaths and injuries of 
contractors who have suffered in support of the nation’s war efforts.50 
By analogy, consider similar research in the homicide context, which 
suggests that the steady decrease in homicide rates over the last few decades 
may be due more to advances in emergency medical technology than to an 
actual reduction in violent crime.51  Accordingly, “[t]he relative rarity of 
homicides, and the fact that they are made even more rare by medical 
intervention, may make homicide data alone a less reliable vehicle for 
studying etiology and prevention than the combination of homicides and 
assaults.”52 
This conclusion directly applies in the wartime context, as military 
fatalities alone have become a less reliable vehicle for examining the total 
human cost of war.  A massive contractor presence permits the 
Administration to suggest, and the public to believe, that our military 
presence on the ground is smaller – by as much as half – than what is 
actually required to accomplish the mission.  Even as President Obama took 
steps to officially end combat operations and withdraw troops in Iraq, he 
made no representation that there would be a proportionate decrease in 
contractor staffing; in fact, Ambassador Jeffries’s testimony regarding the 
State Department’s preparations to continue the reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq clearly indicated that additional contractors will be required to fill the 
void.53 
This implicates the broader outsourcing trend, which we do not attempt 
to chronicle here.54  Suffice it to say that government contractors are 
 
 50. For a sobering series of articles on the numerous issues facing wounded 
contractors, see T. Christian Miller, Disposable Army: Civilian Contractors in Iraq & 
Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA.COM, http://www.propublica.org/series/disposable-army.  Of 
course, we commend the New York Times  prominently discussing issuesar relating to the 
risks facing contractors in Afghanistan.  See Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1; infra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not 
defined.-163. 
 51. See Anthony R. Harris et al., Murder and Medicine: The Lethality of Criminal 
Assault 1960-1999, 6 HOMICIDE STUD. 128, 130 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 156. 
 53. See Pincus, supra note 29. 
 54. As Paul Light explained in his book The True Size of Government, despite a 
generation of bipartisan efforts to portray a “small government” to the public, government 
mandates continue to increase, leaving agencies no choice but to increasingly rely upon 
contractors to provide mission-critical services.  See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF 
GOVERNMENT (1999).  The most recent iteration of constant reform in this arena is intended 
“to assist agency officers and employees in ensuring that only Federal employees perform 
work that is inherently governmental or otherwise needs to be reserved to the public sector.”  
Publication of the Officer of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 
Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227, 56236 
(Sept. 12, 2011). 
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gaining a greater presence on the battlefield because the government 
increasingly depends on the private sector to sustain our war, intelligence, 
and homeland security efforts.55  Contractors are employed more than ever 
in critical support positions, such as gathering intelligence, maintaining 
weapons, providing static and mobile security, training troops, and handling 
interrogations.56  Using contractors generally,57 as well as in more specific 
contingency operations, can have significant benefits.58  But today’s 
 
 55. Congressional and executive leadership wonder whether we have become too 
dependent upon contractors.  The Obama administration has embarked upon an aggressive 
effort to redefine those functions that are inherently governmental and, in effect, “insource” 
resources with an eye towards restoring government capacity to perform these important 
functions.  See Memorandum on Government Contracting, 1 PUB. PAPERS 180 (Mar. 4, 
2009).  If the Administration makes good on these promises – granted, an unlikely scenario – 
this will reverse an aggressive outsourcing trend that spanned the 16 years of the predecessor 
Clinton and Bush administrations.  As indicated, passim, any momentum such an initiative 
may have had appears to have dissipated.  Indeed, the current pervasiveness of contractors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan will have significant strategic implications for future conflicts.  See 
T.X. Hammes, Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic 
Impact, JOINT FORCE Q., Jan. 2011, at 26, 34 (“The size and type of force that we build for 
the future depend on a clear concept of how the United States plans to use contractors, both 
armed and unarmed, in present and future conflicts.”). 
 56. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT COST?, supra note  20, at 20-
22 (2009); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised 
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 
(2005).  On August 11, 2011, DoD issued a final rule establishing policy and procedures “for 
the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel 
performing private security functions under a covered contract.”  Private Security 
Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other 
Significant Military Operations, 76 Fed. Reg. 49650, 49655 (Aug. 11, 2011).  This rule also 
establishes policy on incident reporting and rules for the appropriate use of force.  Id.  For a 
discussion of the modern deputizing trend in homeland security and intelligence, see Jon D. 
Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All 
the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 901 (2008). 
 57. See IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that 
using contractors provides the government with “the ability to tailor efforts more easily to 
available budgets[,]” “provides access to expertise developed outside of government 
contracting[,]” and allows for “performance improvements [to be] well-documented when 
work is completed[.]”). 
 58. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, deploying contractors in a 
contingency operation can yield numerous benefits. The Commission suggests that, among 
other things, contractors can: 
▪   Offer skills and experience that government agencies lack or possess only to a 
limited extent; 
▪ Free up military personnel for combat or other critical missions; 
▪ Reduce the need to hire and train new federal civilian employees;  
▪ Provide flexibility in expanding and reducing support personnel quickly and as 
needed;  
▪ Be more cost-effective for performing certain support functions; and 
▪ Provide jobs and training opportunities to local nationals in keeping with 
economic development or counter-insurgency policies. 
DEAD CONTRACTORS [POST] (DO NOT DELETE ) 4/4/2012  3:46 PM 
2011] CONTRACTOR DEATHS AND CASUALTY SENSITIVITY   15 
 
military cannot effectively fight or sustain itself without an enormous, 
highly integrated contractor presence.59  Ashton B. Carter, the current 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, testified before the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting that the exigencies of war and the difficulties of doing 
business locally in Afghanistan may have contributed to “the unaccustomed 
need to have so many contractors support our contingency operations, 
though by now this should be recognized as a phenomenon that’s here to 
stay and should not be unaccustomed.”60 
The outsourcing of military responsibilities is not limited to DoD. It 
extends well into other agencies, such as the Department of State, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of 
Homeland Security.61  Both the State Department and USAID employ a 
burgeoning cadre of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan that often work 
beside DoD contractors and personnel.  For example, Blackwater 
Worldwide began its private security operations in Iraq in 2004 under the 
State Department’s global security services contract.62  Therefore, it is 
important to keep in mind that contractor fatalities are not limited to DoD 
contractors. 
The ubiquity of government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 
correlates with the disturbing increase in contractor fatalities.  The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently reported that private 
security contractors are four times more likely to be killed in Afghanistan 
than uniformed personnel.63  But these deaths are by no means limited to 
 
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18. 
 59. According to Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, “Contract management 
continues to be one of the Department’s top priorities, both at home and in a contingency 
environment. . . . Another key is having the right quantity and quality of people under them.  
Resourcing has been – and continues to be – a challenge for the Department.”  Test. of 
Ashton B. Carter, Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisitition, Tech. & Logistics, before the 
Comm’n on Wartime Contracting: Better Buying Power in Defense Spending 4-5 (Mar. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-03-28_testimony-
Carter.pdf. 
 60. Testimony of Ashton B. Carter, supra note 2, at 3. 
 61. See Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 14, at 10; Schooner, Contractor 
Atrocities, supra note 56, at 3-6; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 20 (stating that “[t]he number of contractors and grantee employees supporting 
State and USAID in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly exceeds the agencies’ employees—18 to 1 
for State, and 100 to 1 for USAID.”)   
 62. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., PRIVATE SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf. 
 63. Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress 
(Cong. Res. Service R40835), Feb. 21, 2011, at 12.  There are many reasons for this 
disparity.  There are likely to be differences in the levels of professional training and 
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arms-bearing contractors.  Data from 2008 “show that the chances of 
humanitarian aid workers dying by violence were almost six times those of 
U.S. police officers,”64 and anecdotal evidence indicates that truck driving 
remains the most dangerous job in these regions.65   
Against this backdrop, we sense that high contractor casualties produce 
a substitution effect that artificially reduces the public’s perception of the 
human cost of our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan – quantified by some 
exclusively as soldier casualties.  As the U.S. government increases its use 
of contractors in contingency operations, it simultaneously reduces the 
number of tasks completed by military personnel.66  In addition to 
outsourcing jobs that were previously performed by soldiers, the 
government is outsourcing the physical risks of injury and death associated 
with those jobs, resulting in fewer military casualties. 
Sadly, the media rarely mention contractor fatalities, and it is uncertain 
how aware the public is of these disturbing trends.67  While military 
 
available equipment between public military soldiers and private contractors.  See, e.g., infra 
note 141. 
 64. M.A. Thomas, It’s Dangerous Out There, AM. INT., Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 56, 57, 
available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=888 (“Unlike police 
officers, however, few aid workers have any training or equipment for self-protection; 
indeed, many are deeply conflicted about whether and how to protect themselves.”).  As this 
article aptly states: “[T]his is not your parents’ aid work. What today’s idealistic young 
people are not told is that . . . foreign aid work has become a high-risk occupation. . . . While 
data on aid worker mortality is poor, the data . . . suggests that if aid were a domestic U.S. 
industry, aid work would follow deep-sea fishing and logging as the third or fourth most 
dangerous occupation.”  Id. at 56. 
65.  In a single, high-profile example, an attack on a convoy left six men dead, eleven 
seriously wounded, and one missing and presumed dead.  See Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 
F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2006).  
 66. Indeed, in today’s foreign policy environment, NGOs have been recast “as a ‘soft 
power’ tool of U.S. foreign policy, a ‘force multiplier’ for U.S. combat forces and a valuable 
source of military intelligence.”  Id. at 58.  This “poses a particular problem for NGOs that 
see themselves as humanitarians adhering to the principles articulated by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  Id.  Perhaps most importantly: 
While some NGOs are fighting to maintain distinctions between combatants and 
aid workers, . . . these boundaries are collapsing and are likely beyond resurrection 
in a new era of warfare.  With so many actors engaged in similar tasks – soldiers, 
military contractors, civilian government aid workers, civilian aid workers 
embedded in military units, development contractors, development contractors 
owned by military contractors, development NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, multi-
mandated NGOs . . . , NGOs who are also government contractors – it would be 
difficult for even conscientious combatants to tell who would be entitled to 
protected status without the help of . . . lawyers and accountants.  The targeted 
attacks on aid workers suggest that insurgents are not even interested in attempting 
to draw this difficult distinction, nor are terrorists . . . . 
Id. at 60. 
 67. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 260 (“Unprompted, nine of the ten 
interviewees asked something to the effect of ‘is this true?’  They then went on to say they 
had no idea contractors were being used this way in Iraq and expressed great surprise that 
non-U.S. citizens were serving under contracts with [private military and security 
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“[c]asualty figures are routinely collected and released” to the public, 
“[t]here is no such coordinated or automatic diffusion of information about 
contractors, nor are there triggers to alert the media.”68  The media, 
therefore, fails to fulfill a critical role in this context; it neither informs the 
public nor fosters debate amongst policy-makers. 
The media report debates among leaders and experts to members of 
the public, who consider and discuss them.  The media 
subsequently poll these same members of the public, informing 
leaders of the success of their persuasive arguments.  While 
something of a simplification, this captures some of the most 
important features of how the democratic conversation works.69 
This conversation – involving policy-makers and the public and facilitated 
by the media – is critical to informed decision-making.70  An accurate tally 
of contractor casualties is important to fully assess the military’s reliance on 
outsourcing and how that might affect military casualties in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and with it, the public’s overall casualty sensitivity. 
V.  OUTSOURCING CASUALTIES: QUANTIFYING THE SUBSTITUTION 
Before we begin parsing the carnage, some clarification and caveats 
may be in order.  Our data compares the volume of military deaths – the 
deaths of members of the armed services – to contractor deaths.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, we attempt to track and depict only what 
appears to be a mounting substitution of contractor fatalities for military 
losses.  Our quantification makes no attempt to represent the universe of 
suffering as a result of the U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Specifically, we do not attempt to quantify enemy combatants or civilian 
 
companies].”). 
 68. Id. at 245 (“The ratio of coverage of [private military security contractors] to the 
military was . . . very low.”). Avant & Sigelman ultimately found a 1/27 ratio in the amount 
of contractor coverage over the amount of military coverage in the St. Louis Times Dispatch 
and a 1/47 ratio in the New York Times.  See id. 
 69. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 96-97. 
 70. Id. at xxiii (emphasis added): 
The historical record suggests that the public’s tolerance for casualties and its 
support for U.S. wars and military operations will continue to be based upon a 
sensible assessment of normative and pragmatic considerations, more fully 
informed by leaders.  When such an assessment leads to broad recognition that 
important interests are engaged, important principles are being promoted, and the 
prospects for success are high, the majority of the American public is likely to 
accept costs that are commensurably high with the perceived stakes. . . . [I]n the 
end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most 
compelling and promising causes, and they look to their leaders to illuminate just 
how compelling and promising the causes are. 
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(Iraqi or Afghani) deaths.  Nor does the data include the deaths of coalition 
forces, those members of the militaries of states allied in support of the U.S. 
military missions.71  Similarly, we neither track nor include fatalities 
amongst contractors working for other states or governments.  We also do 
not include non-military/non-contractor U.S. civilian deaths, such as 
fatalities amongst non-uniform employees of the U.S. Department of State, 
the Agency for International Development, or the various Defense 
Department agencies.  Finally, we make no effort to distinguish contractors 
based upon which U.S. agency or department they serve or, more broadly, 
the task that they perform or the skill sets they bring to bear.72  To the extent 
that more data has recently become publicly available, the data still includes 
significant gaps and reflects wild fluctuations.73  Again, our endeavor here 
 
 71. One Army Judge Advocate suggested: 
[Our] sliding scale fails to address another layer of complexity – foreign soldiers 
themselves.  A key component to [our] mission in Afghanistan is to turn over 
security to the Afghans.  Missions are conducted jointly; Afghan units are graded 
on their ability to perform independent of /along with /under close supervision of 
our troops. . . .[T]he US is paying for not only Afghan equipment but also most of 
the ANSF salaries. . . .  [To the extent that] we are training, equipping and, 
basically paying the salary of, an Afghan soldier, where does he . . . fall?   
Email (Apr. 10, 2011) (on file with author). 
 72. As others have articulated, contractors perform a wide range of services in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and other hotspots.  Among other things, the never ending list of tasks and 
specialties includes: accounting and audit services; construction; cultural anthropology; 
custodial services in offices and housing units; electrical, plumbing, and HVAC (heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning);  food service; flying planes and helicopters; information 
technology; intelligence gathering and analysis; health care; interpretation and translation; 
laundry; management and supervision; mobile security (e.g., protecting high-value targets, 
such as Members of Congress, and escorting convoys); oil pipeline repair, maintenance, and 
management; static security (guarding enclosed bases, diplomatic facilities, depots, etc.); 
training; truck driving; and weapon systems maintenance.  See COMM’N ON WARTIME 
CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 2; but see SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 12 (describing a higher fatality 
rate for arms-bearing contractors).  According to a March 2011Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report, base support represents, by far, the largest category.  Construction 
accounted for the second largest group until the dramatic decline in construction during 
2009.  Security now accounts for the second largest group.  We do not believe, however, that 
this data necessarily reflects the contractor population over the course of the last 8-10 years. 
 73. The CENTCOM census began breaking out logistics/maintenance and training in 
the first quarter of 2010.  See SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at 13-15, 24-25.  We 
discourage researchers from drawing conclusions from the static and short-term data 
depicted in the CRS report.  For example, (1) the short-term snapshots reflect wild 
fluctuations within service sectors (e.g., construction personnel, dropping from 29,937 to 
2,171 in a two-year period); and (2) the “other” category, for the quarter ending March 2008, 
included more than 20,000 contractor personnel.  Moreover, Iraq and Afghanistan present 
different scenarios. “DOD does not report the breakdown of services that contractors provide 
in Afghanistan, with the exception of data on private security contractors. Nevertheless, the 
types of services provided by contractors in Afghanistan are similar to those conducted in 
Iraq, including logistics, construction, linguistic services, and transportation; the percentage 
of contractors providing each service is likely different. DOD officials have stated in the past 
that they will start providing data on the breakdown of services in Afghanistan. However, to 
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is limited to surrogacy.  While we realize that our data, and hence the 
comparisons we draw from that data, are imperfect,74 we have attempted to 
be fully transparent as to the limited data upon which we rely.  
The best available data on contractor fatalities comes from the 
Department of Labor’s Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker 
Compensation, which tracks contractor injuries and deaths based upon 
insurance claims submitted under the Defense Base Act (DBA).75  Under 
the DBA, employers are required to report to the Labor Department 
compensable employee injuries and deaths within ten days of becoming 
aware of the incident.76 
According to this data, more than 2,600 contractors have been killed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (in addition to another sixty-two contractors killed in 
Kuwait) between 2001 and the end of 2011.77  Another 58,000 contractors 
have been injured, more than 22,000 at least somewhat seriously (see 
Figure 2).78  While these numbers were slow to accumulate, Figure 1 
reflects the startling fact that contractor deaths now represent nearly thirty 
 
date, they have not done so.”  Id. at 10.  The CRS report also explains that “[t]he percentage 
of private security contractors operating in Iraq is different that of those operating in 
Afghanistan.”  Id. at 10 n.35. 
 74. The Defense Science Board recently attempted to articulate the scope of this 
problem, ultimately recommending the need for a new taxonomy for services: 
Given the concerns over data quality, [the] eight “portfolio groups” used by the 
DOD to track services are particularly troubling.  While these groupings may make 
semantic sense, they are not appropriate to determine guidance and policy.  The 
“knowledge-based services” portfolio group, as an example, inappropriately 
combines routine education and training contracts with expeditionary logistics 
management contracts.  This portfolio group is overly vague and cannot provide 
meaningful analysis of performance insights. 
IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at 6. 
 75. The DBA applies the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (2006), “in respect to the injury or death of any 
employee engaged in any employment . . . under a contract entered into with the United 
States. . . .”  42 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2006).  The DBA provisions also apply to foreign nationals 
employed by U.S. contractors and “shall be [compensated] in the same amount as provided 
for [U.S.] residents.”  42 U.S.C. §1652(b) (2006). 
 76. 33 U.S.C. §930(a) (2006). 
 77. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (DLHWC) (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.dol. 
gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm.  Year-by-year data on contractor casualties from before 
2009 was obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request and is on file with the authors. 
 78. Globally, a total of 2,620 DBA claims for civilian contractor deaths, and 68,869 
DBA claims for civilian contractor injuries, have been filed since Sept. 2001.  See id.  It goes 
without saying that the majority of these claims came from contractors who worked in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  See also Contractor Casualties on the Rise According to the DOL’s Latest 
DBA Figures, OVERSEAS CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS (Jan. 11, 2011), available at 
http://civiliancontractors.wordpress.com/2011/01/11/contractor-casualties-on-the-rise-
according-to-the-dols-latest-dba-figures/. 
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percent of U.S. fatalities since the beginning of these wars.79 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
CONTRACTOR INJURIES 
2001 – 201180 
 Serious Injuries Total Injuries 
Iraq 16,290 44,606 
Afghanistan 6,202 13,467 
Total 22,492 58,073 
 
Certain firms have been particularly hard hit.  Eighty-two contracting 
firms have lost at least seven employees since 2001.81  Other companies 
 
 79. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty 
Information, DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER (Dec. 31, 2010), available at 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm. 
 80. Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77. 
 81. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (Mar. 31, 2011), available at  http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ 
dbaallemployer.htm.  The total number of companies suffering contractor deaths is 
unknown, as the DOL applies the Rule of 7: “If an employer has fewer than seven cases in 
any Case Type category, the actual number of cases is not shown.  However, the numbers 
are counted toward the total at the bottom of the report.”  About the Defense Base Act Case 
Summary Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Contractors
(2,655)
US Troops 
(6,323)
FIGURE 1
TOTAL FATALITIES
2001 - 2011
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have suffered far more severely; thirty-two companies have lost more than 
twenty employees, eleven companies have lost more than fifty employees, 
and six companies have experienced more than eighty deaths.82  As Figure 3 
demonstrates, L-3 Communications suffered the most of any company, 
having lost 373 employees since 2001.83  It is important to understand that 
not all of the data can be fully reconciled, particularly at the margins.  For 
example, the information on losses within individual firms is not expressly 
limited to contractor deaths occurring in the Middle East. Nonetheless, we 
believe it accurately reflects the trends, to the extent that over ninety 
percent of the total number of deaths reported to DOL occurred in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or Kuwait.84 
  
 
DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsaboutdbareports.htm. 
 82. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, supra note 81. 
 83. See id.  This number includes L-3 Communications’ subsidiaries, MPRI (which 
lost 10 employees), Titan Corporation (which lost 324 employees), and TLOTS1 (which lost 
32 employees).  .Id. 
 84. As of March 31, 2011, a total of 2,620 deaths have been filed through the DBA.  
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77.  Of those, 2,350 occurred in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kuwait, and 75 were labeled as “Nation Pending.”  See id.  Four 
insurance carriers have covered the majority of these claims: Insurance Company of the 
State of Pennsylvania; Continental Casualty Company; ACE American Insurance Company; 
and Zurich American Insurance Company, and 111 claims were filed through an uninsured 
employer.  See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Carrier, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ 
dbaallcarrier.htm. 
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FIGURE 3 
CONTRACTOR FATALITIES BY EMPLOYER 
2001 – 201185 
Employer Fatalities 
L-3 Communications (including subsidiaries 
MPRI; Titan Corp.; TLOTS1) 373 
The Supreme Group (including subsidiary 
Supreme Food Service) 241 
Compass Security 163 
Service Employees International 127 
DynCorp International (including subsidiary 
DynCorp Technical Services) 101 
AEGIS (including subsidiaries Aegis Defense 
Service; Mission Essential Personnel) 89 
 
Additional complexities are created by the difficulties in distinguishing 
prime contractors and subcontractors – distinctions not made in the DBA 
data – and we make no effort here to do so.  For example, Kellogg, Brown, 
and Root (KBR) stated in 2008 that it had lost at least 122 employees, but it 
included subcontractor deaths in this count.86  While the exact relationship 
between prime contractors and subcontractors is obviously quite opaque, it 
is worth noting that the DBA applies to subcontractors.87  As a result, 
subcontractor fatalities are included in the DBA’s overall count. 
Predictably, the overall carnage has been greater in Iraq, where more 
than 1,560 contractors, about a quarter of the overall U.S. death toll in that 
country, have died since 2003 (see Figure 4).  By comparison, in 
Afghanistan, the 1,095 dead contractors represent nearly forty percent of 
U.S. deaths in that country. 
 
 85. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, supra note 81. 
 86. Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38 PARAMETERS 78, 87 
(2008) (“KBR reports that, through July 2008, in addition to 87 ‘hostile fatalities,’ its 
employees suffered 22 vehicular fatalities, 13 workplace fatalities, and approximately 850 
‘hostile injuries’ in the Middle East.” (citing KBR Middle East Region – Casualty Summary: 
January 2003 – July 2008 (on file with author))). 
 87. See 42 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2006). 
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FIGURE 4 
TOTAL FATALITIES 
2001 – 2011 
 US Troops88 Contractors89 
Iraq 4,474 1,560 
Afghanistan 1,849 1,095 
Total 6,323 2,655 
 
While the enormity of contractor sacrifice gives pause, what is even 
more striking is that – in both Iraq and Afghanistan – contractors are 
bearing an increasing proportion – annually and cumulatively – of  the 
death toll.  DBA fatality claims by contractors in 2003 represented only 
four percent of all fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan.  From 2004 to 2007, 
that number rose to twenty-seven percent.  From 2008 to the end of 2010, 
DBA fatality claims accounted for an eye-popping forty percent of the 
combined annual death toll.  In 2010 and 2011, contractor fatality claims 
represented nearly half (forty-seven and forty-eight percent, respectively) of 
all fatalities.   
The situation in Iraq mirrors this proportional trend.  While the number 
of military deaths stayed relatively constant between 2004 and 2007, the 
number of contractor deaths steadily increased.  Contractor fatalities 
represented only five percent of the annual death toll in 2003, but quickly 
exceeded twenty percent in 2004, and reached thirty-six percent in 2008.  
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that contractor deaths actually surpassed 
military deaths in 2009 and 2010, although the carnage in 2010 was less 
than half of what it was in 2009 (see Figure 7).  Over the past three years, 
more U.S. contractors have been killed in Iraq than U.S. military soldiers.  
This is not surprising, given the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and the 
official completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  As the U.S. military’s 
focus shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, a plethora of contractors remain in 
Iraq to continue the reconstruction effort. 
 
 
 88. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79. 
 89. Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77. 
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 90. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79; Defense Base Act Case Summary by 
Nation, supra note 77. 
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In Afghanistan, the trend accelerated late in the decade.  From 2005 to 
2008, contractor fatalities represented only twenty to thirty percent of the 
death toll.  That percentage, however, rose in recent years; contractor deaths 
represented thirty-six percent of all U.S. fatalities in 2009, forty-six percent 
of U.S. fatalities in 2010, and forty-eight percent of U.S. facilities in 2011 
(see Figure 8).91  More than eighty-six percent of all contractor fatalities in 
Afghanistan occurred between 2009 and 2011.  From the beginning of the 
Afghanistan war to the end of 2009, a total of 289 contractors and 936 
military troops were killed.  Since 2010, more than 806 contractors and 913 
military troops were killed (see Figure 9).  This makes 2010 and 2011 the 
most dangerous period on record in Afghanistan for both contractors and 
U.S. troops (see Figure 10).  Indeed, the future of the Afghanistan war 
remains far from clear.  Ambassadors Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas 
Pickering have questioned the success of the U.S. counterinsurgency and its 
ability to eradicate the Taliban through military force.92 
 
 91. Contractor deaths reportedly outpaced U.S. military fatalities in the first half of 
2010.  From January to June, 232 contractor deaths and 195 troop fatalities were reported.  
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty 
Information, supra note 79.  See also Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors 
and the Ultimate Sacrifice, SERVICE CONTRACTOR 16, 17 (2010) (addressing the rise in 
contractor fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan through June 2010).  In the second half of 2010, 
however, over 304 U.S. troops were killed, compared with only 188 contractor deaths. See 
Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty Information, 
supra note 79. 
 92. Lakhdar Brahimi & Thomas R. Pickering, Settling the Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES, 
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FIGURE 9 
AFGHANISTAN FATALITIES  
2010 – 201193 
Contractors 806 
US Troops 913 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEE 
DD1231F930A15750C0A9679D8B63&ref=afghanistan.  Ambassadors Brahimi and 
Pickering state that “[e]fforts by the Afghan government, the United States and their allies to 
win over insurgents and co-opt Taliban leaders into joining the Kabul regime are unlikely to 
end the conflict.”  Id.  If the United States is to succeed in its Afghanistan mission, according 
to Brahimi and Pickering, it needs to start considering the possibility of negotiated 
settlement.  See id. (“The United States has been holding back from direct negotiations, 
hoping the ground war will shift decisively in its favor. But we believe the best moment to 
start the process toward reconciliation is now, while force levels are near their peak.”). 
 93. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79; Defense Base Act Case Summary by 
Nation, supra note 77. 
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VI.  AN IMPERFECT PICTURE: UNDER-REPRESENTATIVE DATA 
The lack of publicly available data on contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan creates additional complexities. Traditionally, the data derived 
from DBA insurance claims was not publicly available and could only be 
obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests.94  Only recently has 
the Labor Department begun publishing much of this information on its 
website, a positive step in increasing the public’s awareness of contractor 
casualties.95 
Unfortunately, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently 
confirmed that there are numerous problems associated with this data, 
which likely under-represents the total number of contractor deaths and 
injuries.96  The Labor Department’s database was not designed for this 
task;97 rather, Labor only designed its database to compile the number and 
type of insurance claims filed under the DBA and not to track the actual 
deaths and injuries of contractor personnel.98  As such, “Labor officials . . . 
explained that not all deaths and injuries reported under DBA would be 
regarded as contractors killed or wounded within the context of the” 
statutory mandate.99  The DBA database only reflects a contractor’s death 
when the family or employer files a claim for insurance compensation, 
which does not always occur immediately after the incident giving rise to 
the claim, assuming a claim is filed at all.100  The DBA data also fails to 
track the deaths and injuries of personnel working under non-contract 
assistance instruments (i.e., grants) because these instruments are not 
 
 94. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, supra note 86, at 86. 
 95. This website may be found at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm.  
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77.  See also Schooner & Swan, 
supra note 91, at 17. 
 96. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 
DOD, STATE, AND USAID FACE CONTINUED CHALLENGES IN TRACKING CONTRACTS, 
ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS, AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL 24-25 (2010). 
 97. According to a GAO report: 
Labor’s DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for determining the 
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan while 
working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts . . . Labor – unlike DOD, State, and 
USAID – has no responsibilities for tracking killed or wounded contractor 
personnel, and as such, its data were not designed to do so. . .  
Additionally, because Labor does not track cases by agency or contract, DBA data 
cannot be analyzed to determine how many cases involved contractor personnel 
working specifically on DOD, State, or USAID contracts. . .  
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: DOD, 
STATE, AND USAID CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES IN TRACKING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL 
AND CONTRACTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 17-18 (2009). 
 98. Id. at 24. 
 99. Id. at 25 (referencing the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2008). 
 100. Id. at 35 n.33. 
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subject to the DBA.101 
The Inspector General of the Department of Labor expressed further 
concern about the efficiency and accuracy of the DBA claims process.102  
Specifically, the Inspector General estimated that around sixty-eight percent 
of employers fail to report employee injuries in a timely manner.103  
Additionally, administrative problems exist due to the antiquity of the 
DBA, which “was enacted during World War II [and] has not been 
modified or adequately staffed to take into consideration the current use of 
contractors and foreign nationals in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
the rapid increase in DBA cases that have resulted from these wars.”104 
Language and literacy barriers also present a serious challenge to 
ensuring that foreign contractors and their employees fully understand their 
rights and responsibilities under the DBA.105  Accordingly, the actual 
number of contractor fatalities is probably higher than currently known, 
particularly with respect to local hires and third country contractors.106  It is 
also possible that the recent upward trends are more indicative of efforts by 
Labor officials to improve the DBA claims process and ensure compliance 
by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.  For example, efforts have recently 
been made to clarify when DBA insurance requirements apply, educate 
contractors on their rights under the DBA, and translate insurance 
information into Arabic.107 
Contemplating the data from the standpoint of specific agencies, most, 
including the defense agencies, initially made little or no effort to keep 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 02-11-001-04-430, OWCP 
NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS MONITORING AND MANAGING OF DEFENSE BASE ACT CLAIMS 2-4 
(2011), available at http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2011/03-11-001-04-430.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 6-7 (Labor officials “recognized that delays in reporting injuries – especially 
for foreign workers arising from remote war zones – are endemic, and DBA employers have 
great difficulty in meeting the 10-day requirement to submit injury reports to OWCP.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-280R, DEFENSE BASE ACT 
INSURANCE: REVIEW NEEDED OF COST AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 5 (2005); see also 
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (“[C]ontractor 
deaths are undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal statistics are based on 
filed insurance claims, and many foreign contractors’ employees may be unaware of their 
insurance rights and therefore unlikely to file for compensation.”). 
 106. For example, the War Hazards Compensation Act specifically excludes coverage 
“in the case of any person (1) whom residence is at or in the vicinity of the place of his 
employment, and (2) who is not living there solely by virtue of the exigencies of his 
employment, unless his injury or death resulting from injury occurs or his detention begins 
while in the course of his employment. . . .”  War Hazards Compensation Act §101(d), ch. 
668, 56 Stat. 1028, 1030 (1942) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1701(d) (2006)). 
 107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-772T, DEFENSE CONTRACTING: 
PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING DEFENSE BASE ACT REQUIREMENTS, BUT COMPLETE 
INFORMATION ON COSTS IS LACKING 5 (2008). 
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track of how many contractors they employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
much less the number of contractors killed or wounded.108  Only recently 
has Congress mandated that the Pentagon, the State Department, and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) track how many 
contractors are working in Iraq and Afghanistan and how many have been 
killed and wounded.  In response to a 2008 Congressional mandate, DoD 
created the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) 
to track information on contingency contractor operations, including 
contractor casualties.109  DoD concedes, however, and GAO confirms, that 
SPOT remains an inadequate source of data on this critical information.110  
 
 108. Coordination between the various agencies in theater merely exacerbates the 
problem.  ”[D]uring the first several years of the [Iraq] conflict, the DOD did not even have 
the ability to count and keep track of contractors from the Department of State, and as 
recently as February of 2008 had still not fully entered the State Department contractors into 
the DOD tracking database.”  DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 59 (citing An Uneasy 
Relationship: U.S. Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’tal Affairs 6 (2008) (statement of Jack Bell, 
Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. for Logistics and Materiel Readiness)). 
 109. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 
§861, 122 Stat. 3, 253-254 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §2302 Note).  For additional 
information on SPOT, see Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker Enterprise 
Suite (SPOT ES), www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/SPOT_ES_Overview_Oct_2010 
_SPOT_101_Releasable.pptx.  This DoD presentation introduces SPOT as: “A single, joint 
enterprise system on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) employed for: the management, 
tracking and visibility of contractors accompanying U.S. forces overseas and contingency 
operations[;] capturing movement and location information about operating forces, 
government civil servants, and government contractors in specified operational theaters[;] 
and providing dynamic, ad hoc reporting by putting the power of data reporting and analysis 
in the hands of the analyst.”  Id.  The NGO community has raised concerns with regard to 
SPOT.  Specifically: 
SPOT. . . threatens to undermine NGO effectiveness, humanitarian worker safety, 
and NGO’s ability to work in partnership with . . . civilian branch agencies . . . in 
areas of the world that are of vital national interest and where NGOs have a 
comparative advantage on the ground in terms of relating to local populations... 
SPOT. . . requires a far more detailed level of personal information on program 
staff than mandated by the legislation.  . . .[T]he categories of information required 
under SPOT were not developed with host country nationals in mind and may be 
impossible to obtain and update regularly. . . . 
[A]s the system is owned . . . by DoD with its contents subject to interagency 
information-sharing and intelligence gathering. . . , the decision to use SPOT failed 
to consider some significant implications for, and special challenges to, U.S. 
NGOs who are dedicated to working as neutral actors . . . SPOT . . . blurs the 
distinction between civilian led humanitarian and development activities and U.S. 
military operations and creates a perception that NGOs are closely associated with 
the military and U.S. intelligence forces. 
INTERACTION, SYNCHRONIZED PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL TRACKER (SPOT) FACT 
SHEET, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.charityandsecurity.org/system/files/ 
Synchronized%20Pre.pdf. 
 110. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 7. A recent 
GAO report concluded that, “while SPOT has the ability to reflect the number of personnel 
killed or wounded, contractors are not routinely using this function and therefore the data are 
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Basically, DoD, by far the largest contracting agency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, has not even seriously begun to track contractor deaths and 
injuries.111  It is difficult to understand this failure, given the existing 
statutory, regulatory, and contractual mandates regarding compliance.  For 
most relevant contracts to be performed outside the United States, the 
government’s contracting officer is required to use a standard, remedy-
granting clause.112  The required clause contains exhaustive warnings and 
requirements.113  The DoD’s regulatory guidance114 and the DoD version of 
 
unreliable.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-886, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CANNOT FULLY ACCOUNT FOR CONTRACTS, ASSISTANCE 
INSTRUMENTS, AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL 9 (2011).  The report also stated that “SPOT still 
cannot be used to reliably track statutorily required contract, assistance instrument, and 
personnel data as agreed to in the agencies’ [Memorandum of Understanding] because of a 
number of longstanding practical and technical limitations.”  Id. at 22.   
 111. Id.  Thus the problem is not merely keeping track of dead contractors; the 
government continues to struggle to keep track of live, working contractors: 
Since the beginning of the Iraqi conflict, none of the agencies that have hired . . . 
contractors could give Congress an accurate account of the total number of 
contractors hired or deployed . . .  [T]he 2008 Defense Authorization Act 
mandated that . . . DOD . . . take charge of counting contractors, but as recently as 
2009, many years into the Iraqi operation, the government still had no accurate 
system even to track how many of its own private contractors are in the country.  
In addition, when a firm working . . . with DOD hires a [sub]contractor . . . , the 
agency does not consistently include those subcontractors in its tally. 
DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 108 (citing GAO-10-1, supra note 97, at 8-15). 
 112. 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19.  The clause is required for contracts to be performed: “In a 
designated operational area during – (1) Contingency operations; (2) Humanitarian or 
peacekeeping operations; or (3) Other military operations or military exercises, when 
designated by the combatant commander; or When supporting [certain] diplomatic or 
consular mission[s.]”  See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §25.301-4(a) to (b). 
 113. In addition to providing guidance on pre-deployment training, visas, wearing of 
uniforms, the right to carry weapons and other  things, the clause – Contractor Personnel in a 
Designated Operational Area or Supporting a Diplomatic or Consular Mission Outside the 
United States (Mar 2008), 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19 (emphasis added) – makes clear that: 
  “Contract performance may require work in dangerous or austere conditions. 
Except as otherwise provided in the contract, the Contractor accepts the risks 
associated with required contract performance in such operations.”  48 C.F.R. 
§52.225-19(b)(2). 
  “Unless personnel data requirements are otherwise specified in the contract, 
the Contractor shall establish and maintain with the designated Government 
official a current list of all Contractor personnel in the areas of performance. 
The Contracting Officer will inform the Contractor of the Government official 
designated to receive this data and the appropriate system to use for this effort.  
[Also, t]he Contractor shall ensure that all employees on this list have a current 
record of emergency data, for notification of next of kin, on file with both the 
Contractor and the designated Government official.”   48 C.F.R. §52.225-
19(g)(1) to (2). 
  “In the case of isolated, missing, detained, captured or abducted Contractor 
personnel, the Government will assist in personnel recovery actions. . . . 
Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-
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the clause115 both specifically require use of the SPOT database. 
Only the State Department and USAID have initiated meaningful 
efforts to track the deaths and injuries of their contractors.116  During FY 
2009, and the first half of FY 2010, the State Department reported that nine 
of its contractors died and sixty-eight were wounded, while USAID 
reported 116 of its contractors were killed and 121 were wounded.117  These 
numbers, however, were self-reported by contractors, and GAO cautioned 
that “[w]ithout alternative sources of data, [it] could not verify whether 
State’s and USAID’s data were complete . . . . [Additionally,] a recent 
report from the USAID Inspector General suggested that not all security 
contractors in Afghanistan are reporting . . . personnel being injured or 
killed.”118 
 
governmental organizations, other Government-approved action, diplomatic 
initiatives, or through any combination of these options.”  48 C.F.R. §52.225-
19(m)(1) to (2). 
  “The Contractor shall be responsible for notification of the employee-
designated next of kin, and notification . . . to the U.S. Consul . . . if the 
employee – (i) Dies; (ii) Requires evacuation due to an injury; or (iii) Is isolated, 
missing, detained, captured, or abducted.”  48 C.F.R. §52.225-19(n)(1) to (2). 
 114. The DoD FAR supplement also requires that, “[w]hen using the clause at FAR 
52.225-19, the contracting officer shall inform the contractor that the Synchronized 
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) is the appropriate automated system to use 
for the list of contractor personnel required by paragraph (g) of the clause.”  48 C.F.R. 
§225.301-4(2). 
 115. The DoD acquisition regulations supplement this clause and specifically provide:  
The Contractor shall enter before deployment and maintain data for all Contractor 
personnel that are authorized to accompany U.S. Armed Forces deployed outside the 
United States as specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this clause.  The Contractor shall 
use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) web-based 
system, at http://www.dod.mil/bta/products/spot.html, to enter and maintain the 
data. . . . The Contractor shall ensure that all employees in the database have a 
current DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data Card, on file with both the 
Contractor and the designated Government official. . . .   
48 C.F.R. §252.225-7040(g)(1) to (2). 
 116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 23.  See also 
OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, AAPD 10-04, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY 
DIRECTIVE (2010), available at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/ 
cib/pdf/aapd10_04.pdf.  In the background section, the AAPD indicates: “The [current 
version of the] MOU [between DoD, State, and AID] . . . specifies that SPOT will include 
information on contracts in Afghanistan with performance periods of more than 30 days or 
valued at more than $100,000.”  Id.  We conclude from this that contractors killed in 
Afghanistan while working on short-term (less than 30 days) or small (under $100,000) 
contracts would not necessarily be included in SPOT.  See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING (MOU) BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (DOS) AND THE U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEFENSE (DOD) AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (USAID) RELATING TO CONTRACTING 
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_ 
vault/MOU_Signed_July2008.pdf. 
 117. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 23. 
 118. Id. 
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VII.  NUANCES: THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS 
Another unanswered question regarding the inadequacy of publicly 
available data concerns the contractors’ cause of death.  The GAO recently 
examined a sample of DBA death claims that occurred between FY 2009 
and the first half of FY 2010, and found that approximately half (forty-nine 
percent) of these deaths were caused by non-hostile incidents.119  Broken 
down by country, the GAO found that 62.4 percent of DBA death claims in 
Iraq were caused by hostile incidents, compared with only 26.3 percent of 
claims in Afghanistan.  The GAO also found that over thirty percent of non-
hostile deaths resulted from health conditions or illness.  Again, the  GAO’s 
analysis must be read in the context of the small sample size (less than ten 
percent of the total number of DBA cases) and unverifiable data, which 
make it difficult to apply these conclusions to a wider field of contractors.120 
Moreover, members of the military also die from heart attacks and 
vehicle accidents, and DoD and the media count those deaths as military 
fatalities.121  Through the end of 2011, the Washington Post’s “Faces of the 
Fallen” has chronicled a total of 4,474 military deaths in Iraq and 1,849 in 
Afghanistan.122  Cross-referencing this total with data from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center’s Personnel and Procurement Statistics confirms 
that the Washington Post’s numbers include 957 accidental deaths in Iraq 
and 373 accidental deaths in Afghanistan.123  Figure 11 provides a clearer 
view of this breakdown.  
  
 
 119. Id. at 26. 
 120. Id. at 25 n.33.  The GAO examined only a sample of 213 DBA cases; those cases 
were provided by Labor specifically for this purpose, and they are not publicly available. 
 121. We believe this is consistent with the historical approach to measuring battlefield 
deaths.  It is also one of the reasons we prefer the term “fatalities” as opposed to 
“casualties.”  For example, in the most exhaustive study on the topic, the author explained: 
“Categories of casualties include battle deaths, non-battle deaths, wounded in action, and 
prisoners of war (POWs).  Unless otherwise elaborated, the word  “casualties” refers to 
deaths due to hostile action (or battle deaths) for the remainder of this report.”  LARSON, 
CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 7 n.2. 
 122. WASH. POST, Faces of the Fallen, (Jan. 9, 2011), available at http://projects. 
washingtonpost.com/fallen/. 
 123. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79. 
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We concede that it would be worthwhile to conduct a more in-depth 
analysis of contractor fatalities by, for example, cause of death.  We would 
not be surprised if, as the GAO’s data indicates, health-related issues for 
contractors are higher than among military troops due to general 
demographic differences (e.g., we assume the data would show a higher 
median age for contractor personnel), the military’s more rigorous entrance 
screening procedures, and ongoing military physical fitness requirements.  
Consider, for example, that many U.S. military retirees have returned to 
Iraq and Afghanistan as civilian contractors.  Unfortunately, public access 
to the required data remains limited. 
  
 
 124. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79. 
FIGURE 11 
MILITARY DEATHS BY TYPE 
2001 – 2010124 
 Iraq Afghanistan 
Killed in Action 3,517 1,476 
Accidental 957 373 
Total 4,474 1,849 
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VIII.  FOREIGN AND LOCAL LABOR:  
UNINTENDED EXTERNALITY, UNEXPECTED BENEFIT? 
The source of labor also merits further examination.  As a result of the 
increased level of outsourcing in contingency operations, the government 
has discovered a source of uniquely inexpensive labor in foreign nationals. 
The CRS points out the well-accepted fact that foreign nationals work for 
lower salaries than U.S. citizen contractors.125  Local Iraqis and Afghanis 
are the cheapest to hire because of the dismal state of their war-torn 
economies and the fact that their local status avoids transportation and 
housing costs.  Given the acknowledged pervasiveness of foreign nationals 
in the U.S. contracting force, it is safe to assume that many of the U.S. 
government contracting victims in Iraq and Afghanistan are locals and other 
foreign nationals.  This increased layering of complexity126 presents a 
particularly problematic issue from a casualty sensitivity standpoint, as 
public support for U.S. military operations may be (and, we intuit, probably 
is) less influenced by non-U.S. casualties.127 
Unfortunately, the Labor Department’s contractor death and injury 
statistics do not distinguish by trade or nationality.  Inferences, however, 
 
 125. SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 3.   This is not to say that cost is the only justification 
for contracting with foreign nationals.  Indeed, such contracting “can provide economic 
inputs to local economics by hiring locals to provide services.  Creating jobs and stimulating 
the economy are key aspects of population-centric counterinsurgency.”  Hammes, supra note 
23, at 29.  
 126. Consider a continuum, with either citizen conscripts (or draftees) or an all-
volunteer army or militia at one extreme.  See Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 241 
(“The fact that citizens are required to give up their time, if not their lives, in service to the 
country’s goals should increase the stake of citizens in those goals, enhancing participation.  
It should ensure that citizens show an active interest in . . . the rules by which they are 
conscripted.”).  We sense, and the research suggests, that public perception of the military 
changes as the combatants (or those killed in the battle area) progress across the continuum 
spanning, for example, American military veteran/arms-bearing contractors, American law 
enforcement veteran/arms-bearing contractors, American support contractors, foreign arms-
bearing contractors, foreign support contractors, etc. 
 127. Inferences to this effect can be drawn from research on the public’s sensitivity to 
civilian casualties in U.S. military operations.  See ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH, 
RAND CORPORATION, MG-441-AF, MISFORTUNES OF WAR: PRESS AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO 
CIVILIAN DEATHS IN WARTIME 3 (2006), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/ 
MG441.html (“Although it is sometimes argued that large numbers of civilian casualties 
could reverse public support for U.S. military operations, this monograph will show that 
Americans generally have not responded to high-profile incidents of civilian casualties 
during U.S. military operations by withdrawing their support for the operation.” (emphasis 
added)).  Indeed, much of the survey research in this area has not contemplated this scenario.  
See, e.g., LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 7-8 and Table 2.1 (citing 
Americans Talk Security No. 9).  In response to the question: “if you had to make a decision 
about using the American military, how important would each of the following factors be to 
you?”, 86 percent said that the “[n]umber of American lives that might be lost” was “very 
important[.]”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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can be drawn from DoD’s census reports on its defense contracting 
personnel, which DoD began releasing in the second half of 2007. While 
the GAO has raised significant questions about the reliability and accuracy 
of this data,128 the DoD quarterly census reports remain the only readily-
available source for any national breakdown of contractor personnel 
employed in the CENTCOM region.  According to this data, in January 
2011, approximately 77 percent of U.S. defense contractors in Afghanistan 
were foreign nationals, and 68 percent of those were local Afghanis.129  
Local Afghanis also comprised nearly 95 percent of DoD’s private security 
contracting force in Afghanistan, although DoD cautioned that “validation 
of [these] numbers is uncertain due to a rapidly changing environment 
surrounding President Karzai’s Decree 62.”130  In Iraq, 72 percent of DoD’s 
contracting force was foreign nationals, 20 percent of which were local 
Iraqis.131 
The U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, in its February 2011 
Interim Report to Congress, provided a national breakdown of contractors 
for Fiscal Year 2010 that expanded beyond DoD and included State 
Department and USAID contractors, which is reproduced in Figure 12.132   
  
 
 128. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-19, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: 
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 25 (2008) (“The [CENTCOM] census relies on contractor firms to self-report 
their personnel data.  According to DOD officials, when they receive the data they review it 
to ensure that there are no obvious errors, but they do not routinely evaluate the accuracy or 
completeness of the reported data.”). 
 129. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. 
CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html [hereinafter DOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT, 
Jan. 2011].  It is worth noting that the numbers for Afghanistan were even higher not more 
than six months prior to this report.  In May 2010, 85 percent of U.S. defense contractors in 
Afghanistan were foreign nationals, 81 percent of which were local Afghanis.  Apparently, 
DoD’s quarterly reports indicate that DoD eliminated over 70,000 contractor positions 
between May and December of 2010.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND 
AFGHANISTAN (May 2010), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html.  
The Government Accountability Office, however, recently reported in September 2011 that 
“the numbers for local nationals working under contracts in Afghanistan were generally 
overreported . . . [due to] a methodological error [that] resulted in double counting of local 
nationals in Afghanistan for the first three fiscal year 2010 quarters.”  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-886, supra note 11, at 12.  
 130. DOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT, Jan. 2011, supra note 129. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18, at 7.  
The Commission provided updated figures in its Final Report to Congress, which was issued 
during the final editing stages of this article on August 31, 2011.  See COMM’N ON WARTIME 
CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.  
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FIGURE 12 
DEFENSE, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTORS 
IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN FISCAL YEAR 2010133 
Nationality Dep’t of Defense Dep’t of State USAID Total 
Contractor 
Personnel 
Percent 
Total 
Contractor 
Personnel 
Percent  
Total 
Contractor 
Personnel 
Percent  
Total 
Contractor 
Personnel 
Percent 
Total 
U.S. 
Nationals 
41,855 28.9% 4,322 22.4% 805 2.3% 46,982 23.5% 
Iraqi/Afghan 
Nationals 
44,890 31.0% 10,194 53.8% 32,621 91.2% 87,705 43.9% 
Third-
Country 
Nationals 
57,960 40.0% 4,734 24.5% 1,193 3.3% 64,887 32.0% 
Unknown –  – - –  – - 60 0.3% 1,149 3.2% 1,209 0.6% 
Total 144,705 100% 19,310 100% 35,768 100% 199,783 100% 
 
On the whole, it appears that no more than twenty-four percent of U.S. 
contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan are actually U.S. citizens.134 
That figure, though, appears to have risen over the last couple of years, 
suggesting that it might not be prudent to extrapolate too much from this 
limited, volatile dataset.135 
As an aside, third-country nationals, particularly in developing 
countries and areas near battle zones, seem especially susceptible to forced 
labor and human trafficking.  Anecdotal reports identified problems 
involving contractors operating on U.S. bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.136  
 
 133. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 58, at 7. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Indeed, In Iraq, between the fall of 2007 through the end of 2010, the relative 
populations of DoD contractors have shifted (in decreasing order of magnitude) from: (1) 
local nationals, (2) third-country nationals, and (3) U.S. citizens to (1) third-country 
nationals, (2) U.S. citizens, and (3) local nationals. SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at 
17.  Similarly, in Afghanistan, the proportion of DoD contractors that are U.S. citizens and 
third-country nationals has gradually increased, while the percentage of contractors 
represented by local nationals has decreased from eighty percent in 2008 to around fifty 
percent at the end of 2010.  Id. at 11. 
 136. In one recent example of human trafficking, twelve Nepalese men signed labor 
contracts with Daoud & Partners Ltd., a Jordanian subcontractor in Iraq and Afghanistan 
working under KBR, a major U.S. contractor.  These men were under the assumption that 
they were headed to Jordan to serve as hotel staff.  Instead, their passports were seized and 
they were shipped off to Iraq before being captured and executed by Iraqi insurgents.  Jeff 
Jeffrey, Justice for Contract Workers in America’s Wars, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=12024 
76608072&slreturn=1. 
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The exact scope of this reprehensible activity occurring in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is, regrettably, still unknown.137 
Foreign nationals are “cheaper” in a more pernicious sense.  Hiring 
non-Americans for dangerous jobs in Iraq and Afghanistan reduces the 
innumerable risks constantly facing U.S. military personnel and helps to 
reduce the number of U.S. military fatalities.  Of course, the government is 
well aware of the risks facing locals who serve as contractors supporting the 
U.S. mission.  Indeed, the State Department created a number of special 
visa programs that allow certain contractor personnel to enter the United 
States after their service.138  For a host of reasons, however, such programs 
have not proven a panacea against the dangers.139 
Furthermore, if the fatality rate among contractors has little effect on 
public support, either because the public does not know or care about 
 
 137. For more information on the subject of human trafficking in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
see INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, EVALUATION OF DOD CONTRACTS 
REGARDING COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (2011), 
available at http://www.dodig.mil/SPO/Reports/SPO-2011-002_508.pdf. 
 138. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 authorized up to 50 Special 
Immigrant Visas (SIV) annually for Iraqi and Afghani translators and interpreters working 
for the U.S. military.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, §1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note).  In 
2007, Congress expanded the number of authorized SIVs to 500 per year for FY 2007 and 
FY 2008.  See Act of June 15, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-36, §1, 121 Stat. 227, 227 (to be 
codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note).  Congress later made Iraqi and Afghan aliens holding SIVs 
“eligible for resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits available to 
refugees.”  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. V, 
§525, 121 Stat. 1844, 2212.  Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2008 authorized up to 5,000 SIVs per year to Iraqi nationals who were employed by the 
United States for at least one year, “provided faithful and valuable services to the United 
States Government . . . [and have] experienced or [are] experiencing an ongoing serious 
threat as a consequence of the alien’s employment by the United States Government.”  
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1244, 122 
Stat. 3, 397 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1157 note).  In 2009, Congress authorized the same 
program for Afghanistan, setting aside up to 1,500 SIVs per year for Afghani nationals.  See 
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. F, tit. VI, §602, 123 Stat. 524, 
807 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note). 
 139. See Jeff Stein, Iraqi Interpreters Seek Punishment of Contractor They Say Sexually 
Harassed Them, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2011, at A1.  This article describes the ordeal of 
several Iraqi women who worked as translators and sought to obtain SIVs to enter the United 
States: 
The Iraqi women . . . had college educations and spoke English well enough to 
work as interpreters with U.S. combat units, jobs that came with a high mortality 
rate even off the battlefield: Insurgents targeted them for assassination as 
collaborators. . . . Because of the lingering dangers for Iraqis who allied 
themselves with the Americans, the State Department created a special visa to 
allow interpreters and other workers into the United States. . . . After a brazen 
kidnapping attempt by armed men in a Baghdad shopping arcade, [one of the 
interpreters] fled to Europe. . . . “I had to leave Iraq because I faced death threat 
many times . . . ,” she said by telephone. “They said because I worked with the 
Americans, I betrayed my country . . . and I should be dead for that.” 
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contractors, the government and the military have little incentive to 
minimize contractor fatalities.  This is particularly true to the extent that, as 
a general rule, the military, the State Department, and USAID do not take 
responsibility for providing security to their contractors.140  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the military chose to prioritize the issuing of then-scarce 
scarce body armor to soldiers before making it available to civilians.141  Yet 
even when the supply of body armor met demand, the military was slow to 
issue body armor to contractors or mandate its use.142  By hiring non-
 
 140. For contracts performed outside of the United States, “contractors are responsible 
for providing their own . . . security support, including . . . security support for their 
employees.”  48 C.F.R. §25.301-2(a); 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19(c).  The enormous (and 
critically important) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract was the 
primary exception to this policy in Iraq.  According to testimony by Tina Ballard, the United 
States Army Assistant Undersecretary for Procurement & Policy, before the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: “Contracts contain different provisions. 
In the case of the LOGCAP contract, there was a specific provision that prohibited the use of 
private security contractors.”  Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military 
Contractors and Status Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. 185 (2007) (statement of Tina Ballard, Assistant Undersec’y for 
Procurement & Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Army).  Despite this provision, KBR appears to 
have indirectly hired private security through its subcontractors.  See id. at 112.  This 
discovery evolved and turned into a dramatic scandal regarding the reimbursement of the 
costs of that security, fueled in part by the fact that Blackwater was one of the private 
security firms hired by a KBR subcontractor, ESS Worldwide Services. See id.  It is 
interesting how little discussion there has been of what we view as the more pressing issue – 
that the Army ultimately failed to perform its security commitment to protect KBR personnel 
to such an extent that KBR felt the need to privately hire its own security.  Nor have the 
episodic media reports of contractor deaths resulted in a public outcry regarding the 
government’s failure to ensure the safety of the people supporting the government’s 
missions. 
 141. DoD did not make body armor available to contractors until months after all 
military personnel in the region had already received access to body armor.  Even when 
supply was sufficient, DoD’s policy did not even prioritize, much less mandate, that body 
armor be supplied to contractor personnel.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-05-275, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF 
CRITICAL ITEMS DURING CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS 75-81 (April 8, 2005) 
(“Interceptor body armor was not available in sufficient quantities to U.S. military forces in 
Iraq sometime between October 2002 and September 2004 . . .  Because of the shortages, 
many individuals bought body armor with personal funds . . .  The new body armor was 
initially intended for limited numbers of personnel, such as dismounted infantry, however, 
this [later] changed . . .  In May 2003, the Army changed the basis of issue to include every 
soldier in Iraq.  Then in October 2003, CENTCOM further expanded issuance of the body 
armor to include all U.S. military and DOD civilian personnel . . . [in] Iraq, Kuwait, and 
Afghanistan . . .”). 
 142. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-911T, DEFENSE 
LOGISTICS: ARMY AND MARINE CORPS’ BODY ARMOR REQUIREMENTS, CONTROLS, AND 
OTHER ISSUES 8 (2007).  The GAO explained that: 
DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors where 
permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and 
where specified under the terms of the contract. It is CENTCOM’s position that 
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military personnel to perform high-risk tasks that were once considered 
inherently governmental (and thus performed solely by military 
personnel),143 the government is essentially substituting contractor deaths 
that have little or no impact on the public’s casualty sensitivity. 
We concede that further research is required to assess differences in 
public reactions to military deaths, American contractor deaths, and foreign 
contractor deaths.  One study suggested that – with regard to private 
military deaths – there was “little support for the contention that public 
consent is affected by whether a soldier is serving or contracting, and 
[interviews] did not even suggest that the nationality of the soldier 
mattered.”144  As noted below, this conclusion is contrary to expectation and 
anecdotal evidence.  Moreover, the authors concede that: (1) at least one 
interviewee (out of ten) felt better about the contractor fatalities, and (2) 
others initially expressed similar sentiments but “changed their mind as 
they continued to speak.”145 
While it might be premature to conclude that substituting contractor 
sacrifice for military losses directly affects public support for military 
action, raising the question seems both rational and important. 
[T]he general public may care more about the deaths of soldiers, 
who are serving out of a sense of patriotic duty, than of 
[contractors], who are motivated by profit.  This possibility is 
widely recognized in policy analyses of the private military and 
security industry and is reflected in the expectations of policy-
makers. . . . The deaths of soldiers may communicate a message to 
the public about the importance and legitimacy of a mission – 
invoking symbols of sacrifice, patriotism, and national interest – 
and about the importance of sticking it out to honor and validate the 
commitment of those who have fallen.  The deaths of [contractors] . 
. . may elicit different feelings altogether.146 
 
body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of the terms and conditions 
of the contract. . . .  However, the officials said that commanders, at their 
discretion, can provide body armor to any personnel within their area of operation. 
Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, if the government-drafted contract – or the 
subcontract – fails to specify that CENTCOM will provide body armor, CENTCOM’s policy 
is not to provide contractors with body armor unless the individual commander exercises his 
or her discretion to do so. 
 143. As The New York Times columnist Paul Krugman suggested:  “It’s one thing to 
have civilians drive trucks and serve food; it’s quite different to employ them as personal 
bodyguards to U.S. officials, as guards for U.S. government installations, and . . . as 
interrogators in Iraqi prisons.”  Schooner, Contractor Atrocities, supra note 56, at 5 (quoting 
Paul Krugman, Battlefield of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A29). 
 144. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 259. 
 145. Id.  But see infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 146. Id. at 256-257.     
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that, while the American public may see 
a distinction between U.S. contractors and the U.S. military, foreign nations 
and enemy combatants may not.  Indeed, “[t]he hanging of four Blackwater 
contractors on a bridge in Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrated the extent to 
which our enemies see no real difference between the U.S. military and its 
contract employees.”147 
To be sure, there is considerable merit to employing contractors in 
contingency operations, and it is absurd to assume that foreign nationals are 
intentionally being employed solely as “shrapnel catchers.”  Nevertheless, 
the public needs to be aware that the use of foreign nationals as contractors 
has the potential to greatly reduce the number of uniformed (and U.S. 
citizen) casualties, as the level of troop fatalities would certainly not remain 
constant were the U.S. military less dependent on contractors. 
IX.  POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
We see an analogy between the government’s extensive use of foreign 
contractors and the economic arguments that contributed to eliminating the 
draft in the early 1970s.  The economist Walter Oi demonstrated how the 
draft turned soldiers into an inexpensive labor force that could be easily 
misused, resulting in a loss of well-being, motivation, and effectiveness for 
draftees and draft-induced volunteers. 148  Oi also showed that instituting an 
all-volunteer military force, while more expensive per soldier, could 
actually be more effective and result in fewer casualties because of the 
increased wages and training the government provided.  Because of the 
larger investment made in each soldier under an all-volunteer force, the 
government was less inclined to misuse this labor and more likely to care 
about reducing casualty rates.149 
As some scholars have suggested, in the absence of conscription, a 
market-based regime should reduce the public’s concerns regarding the 
deployment of military resources. 
If military “service” is really just a job, if forces can quit at any 
time, and if combatants need not be citizens at all, then the public 
demand for information relevant to forces and the legislative 
interest in their safety should be further weakened.  All things being 
equal, public consent for actions abroad that use hired forces should 
be easier to obtain.150 
 
 147. ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION UNDER CONTRACT 100 (2009). 
 148. See Walter Y. Oi, Should We Bring Back the Draft?, REGULATION (2007), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-2.pdf. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 242. 
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Minimal support exists for this perception today.  From a similar 
economic viewpoint, we wonder if the lack of data on contractor fatalities 
in Iraq and Afghanistan directly or indirectly affects contractor recruitment 
and salary.  If contractor fatality rates, as indicated above, are significantly 
higher than what the labor pool currently understands, prospective 
contractor employees are not able to fully assess and factor in the full risk 
of fatality in their salary (and insurance) negotiations.151  We envision an 
economic model in which, if perfect information regarding the historical 
(and projected) risks of service in the battle area were available, this 
information could hinder contractor recruitment and, potentially, 
dramatically drive up contractor salaries.152 
We see this latter phenomenon potentially exacerbating anti-contractor 
sentiment. Unfortunately, there already is a broadly-voiced concern within 
the public and the media that contractors receive higher pay than their 
military counterparts.153  Despite repetitive outcry, little data supports this 
proposition, particularly when costs associated with education, training, 
healthcare, and retirement are factored in.154 Of course, we do not assume 
that enlisted men and women necessarily receive market-based salaries; a 
broad range of benefits – ranging from educational opportunities (e.g., the 
GI Bill, service academy degree programs, ROTC scholarships), skills 
training and experience, opportunities to work and live abroad, retirement 
and health benefits, to fulfillment of a sense of duty or patriotism – permit 
the government to pay soldiers below-market wages.  Indeed, recent media 
 
 151. As an analogy, consider the fact that “[m]ost individual aid workers remain 
uninformed about the new levels of risk and the weakness of their legal protections. . . . 
Denial, ignorance, negligence and machismo are all costly.”  Thomas, supra note 64, at 59.  
 152. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 33. 
 153. See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Government Pays More in Contracts, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011); Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 
Contractors, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-
files/reports/contract-oversight/bad-business/co-gp-20110913.html. 
 154. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
(2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/MainText.3.1.shtml (“The 
costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit 
performing similar functions.  During peacetime, however, the private security contract 
would not have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force 
structure.”).  See also Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. at 2 n.5 (2007) (statement of Professor Steven L. 
Schooner, Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=022f
8766-0aca-4638-9e35-c2e42fc76159:  
Slavish focus upon the relative cost of contractor support is misguided. 
Specifically, it is not productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too 
much” without: (1) permitting an agency to hire additional personnel; (2) 
confirming that sufficient personnel are available in the marketplace and willing to 
work for the government; (3) comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into 
account all of the costs of civil servants or members of the armed services; and (4) 
considering critical issues such as flexibility and surge capacity. 
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attention has focused on evidence that the cost of supporting military troops 
in Iraq and Afghanistan is as high as one million dollars per soldier, which 
demonstrates that cost may not readily correlate with salary.155  Also, as 
previously stated, most, if not all, foreign nationals employed as U.S. 
contractors are paid considerably less than our military soldiers.156  
Nevertheless, we fear that, should the fatality data become more accurate 
and accessible, the corresponding increases in contractor salaries would 
only increase public antipathy (if not animosity) towards the general loss of 
contractor life.157 
X.  WHY TRANSPARENCY MATTERS 
Over the course of the last decade, the public has become – ever-so-
slowly – increasingly aware of the extent of government’s dependence upon 
contractors.  Part of this derives from an Obama administration 
commitment to greater transparency in government operations.158  In its 
February 2011 Interim Report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on 
Wartime Contracting brought attention to the disturbing number of 
contractor fatalities: 
While doing their jobs, contractors risk being killed, wounded, or 
captured.  Between September 2001 and December 2010, over 
2,200 contractor employees of all nationalities have died and over 
49,800 were injured in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These contractors’ 
 
 155. See Lawrence Korb & Laura Conley, The $1 Million Soldier: What’s Wrong With 
How We Budget War, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://money.cnn. 
com/2011/04/04/news/economy/war_costs_lawrence_korb/index.htm?source=cnn_bin&hpt=
Sbin. 
 156. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 3. 
 157. Scholars have also expressed concerns about the “financial” motivation of 
contractors: 
On the battlefield itself, contractors operate in a murky legal zone outside the 
regular chain of command.  Employees of private military firms answer neither to 
the U.S. military nor to the indigenous population they are involved in defending.  
They answer to the company that employs them.  One can easily imagine scenarios 
where a contract employee, unlike his uniformed counterpart, has the right to walk 
away.  He or she cannot be ordered to fulfill a dangerous mission, yet attainment 
of shared objectives depends on the contractor’s support.  When American life and 
liberty are on the line, financial incentives alone cannot inspire selfless and 
courageous action.  Contractors thus introduce into any military operation a degree 
of uncertainty that is not present when soldiers perform the same task. 
STANGER, supra note 147, at 90. 
 158. At the start of his presidency, President Obama publicly committed himself and his 
Administration “to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government.”  
Presidential Memorandum, Transparency and Open Government, (Jan. 9, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/transparency-and-open-government. 
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deaths and injuries should not be ignored, but should be a part of the 
public debate on the cost of war.159 
To our knowledge, this was the first official comment by Congress or a 
government commission that contractor fatalities should be discussed in 
policy circles.  We thus applaud the Commission for further drawing 
attention to this issue in its Final Report:  
The extensive use of contractors obscures the full human cost of 
war.  The full cost includes all casualties, and to neglect contractor 
deaths hides the political risks of conducting overseas contingency 
operations. In particular, significant contractor deaths and injuries 
have largely remained uncounted and unpublicized by the U.S. 
government and the media. . . . Moreover, contractor deaths are 
undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal statistics 
are based on filed insurance claims, and many foreign contractors’ 
employees may be unaware of their insurance rights and therefore 
unlikely to file for compensation.160 
Early in 2012, we saw further glimpses of progress.161    Frank Kendall, 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, raised the issue at a large conference in New York.162  On 
 
 159. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18, at 8. 
160.  COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-31. 
 161. Previously, Allison Stanger briefly mentioned, in her book, One Nation Under 
Contract, a New York Times report from 2007 on contractor fatalities.  STANGER, supra note 
147, at 99.  See also, JACQUES S. GANSLER, DEMOCRACY’S ARSENAL: CREATING A TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY DEFENSE INDUSTRY, 115-116 (2011). 
 162.  See Transcript of Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, at the Cowen Group’s 33rd Annual 
Aerospace/Defense Conference (New York, Feb. 8, 2012).  Secretary Kendall closed his 
speech with this meaningful anecdote: 
 
Terence Hildner …was a brigadier general in the army [who died in Kabul]. He 
came back to Dover … on a C17. I went to Dover for the transfer of the remains. 
… There's a dignified transfer which is a very solemn and kind of heart wrenching 
for the families but moving ceremony. . . . 
 
There was one other person on that C-17 and it was a contract employee of a 
Canadian firm. After we had done the transfer for General Hildner, General Austin, 
myself, General Mason and the Colonel did the Dignified Transfer for that 
Canadian citizen who was a contractor serving with us in Afghanistan.  
 
I find that very symbolic of the service that industry is providing to us and that you 
really are part of all this with us. I think that the respect and the dignity with which 
we did that and the fact that we all stayed to do it, sends sort of a message about 
how we feel …. It is … a way to say, “Thank you” for that. 
  
Id. at 9-10.  Mr. Kendall’s specificity, and his eloquence on this topic, distinguish him from 
his predecessors and his colleagues. 
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February 12, 2012, The New York Times became the first major news outlet 
to publish a front-page article on the risks facing contractors in the 
battlespace.163   
Sadly, other media outlets have lost interest in the story, and the public 
remains largely ignorant of the extent of sacrifice in the contractor 
community.  The news media rarely investigates or reports on these 
disturbing trends.164  Regardless of whether the public is more or less 
sensitive to contractor deaths than military deaths, the fact remains that the 
public “is much less likely to know about” the contractor deaths.165  
Granted, the nature of contingency contracting, which includes numerous 
functions and spans numerous agencies, is much more diffuse than our 
well-structured and hierarchical military and often complicates the 
collection and aggregation of relevant data.166  Nevertheless, as the military 
and the government struggle to determine the appropriate role for, and 
limits to, outsourcing,167 it is disconcerting that the public does not know 
and cannot acknowledge the extent to which contractors have made the 
ultimate sacrifice. 
Much of the research on casualty sensitivity did not anticipate the 
contemporary use of surrogates for military jobs.  It is uncertain, therefore, 
exactly how an increased awareness of contractor fatalities would affect 
public opinion.  We assert that most moral or philosophical distinctions 
between military and contractor deaths, upon examination, quickly break 
down. A contractor killed today supporting the military mission is a proxy 
for a prior generation’s soldier.168  At least one survey suggests that 
respondents expressed somewhat similar responses – in terms of anger and 
sadness – upon reading about deaths among contractors and soldiers.169  
 
 163. Nordland, supra note 50, at A1 (“This is a war where traditional military jobs, 
from mess hall cooks to base guards and convoy drivers, have increasingly been shifted to 
the private sector.  Many American generals and diplomats have private contractors for their 
personal bodyguards.  And along with the risks have come the consequences: More civilian 
contractors working for American companies than American soldiers died in Afghanistan 
last year for the first time during the war.”).  
 164. Indeed, before 2008, “[f]ew newspapers, and none of the major newspapers, have 
covered the story.”  Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, supra note 86, at 78 n.3. 
The Houston Chronicle was a notable, but rare, exception.  See David Ivanovich, Contractor 
Deaths up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 10, 2008, at A1. 
 165. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 232. 
 166. Id. at 245. 
 167. See, e.g., Publication of the Officer of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy 
Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 
56227, 56236 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
 168. STANGER, supra note 147, at 10 (noting that “[w]ithout contractors, who supply the 
vast majority of the support services in Iraq in order to free up military personnel for combat 
roles, the Bush administration would have had to institute a draft to wage its war there.”). 
 169. Id. at 258 (“The facts that these assessments were no more positive among soldiers 
should occasion surprise among those who would expect the use of contractors to decrease 
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Anecdotal evidence from online media sources, however, suggests a 
dramatically different result.  Indeed, we have been not only disappointed 
but taken aback by the volume and intensity (or, maybe more accurately, 
venom) of anti-contractor sentiment expressed in online comment in 
reaction to prior publications discussing contractor fatalities (e.g., in The 
Washington Post and ProPublica).170 
Some people certainly view contractors as expendable profiteers or 
adventure seekers who are not entitled to the same respect as military 
personnel.171  Similar arguments, however, were made in the late 1960s by 
opponents to an all-volunteer military force.  As discussed in Sol Tax’s, The 
Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives, economist Milton Friedman 
fiercely responded at a conference in December 1966 at the University of 
Chicago: 
 
political costs because people care less about contractor deaths.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Steven Schooner, Remember Them, Too: Don’t Contractors Count When We 
Calculate the Costs of War? (May 25, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/24/AR2009052401994_Comments.html.  A representative sample 
follows: 
“[I] do not feel they have a place of honor next to our military. Not even close.”; 
“[C]ontractors are mercenaries [stet] and I’m sorry but they just don’t count the 
same as the man or woman in uniform putting their life on the line because they 
wear the uniform and fight for Our Country[.]”; “Why memorialize 
contractors? . . . They. Don’t. Matter.”; “I have little compassion for all those 
contractors, . . . They do what they do for the money. The fact that that job might 
get them killed is something [they] need to factor into their considerations of 
whether the salary is worth it. . . .  Mercenaries are mercenaries, and if they want 
their own memorial day, let them have it. In secret, as befits mercenaries.”; “[T]o 
compare the sacrifice of the men and women of our armed forces to the human 
cost of for-profit civilian contractors is nonsense.”; “A mercenary is never the 
same as a patriot. Money does matter. It is the difference between a wife and a 
prostitute.”; “Sorry - no matter what nice new job title you dream up, these 
‘contractors’ are mercenaries. They . . . have never, ever been accorded any honor. 
They should not expect it now.”; “Why should mercenaries be counted among the 
honored dead? . . . They are truly the most despicable people on the planet. . . . 
This is the most ridiculous suggestion I’ve ever heard and is an insult to everyone 
who’s ever worn the uniform.”; “I bet they’re all burning in hell.” 
See also T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/ 
this-year-contractor-deaths-exceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923#comments. Of 
course, we do not suggest that online commenting accurately represents, well, anything.  But 
these comments differ dramatically from Avant & Sigelman’s interpretation of their survey 
data.  See Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 256-261. 
 171. Id.  Popular culture reinforces these perceptions.  In the movie Clerks (View 
Askew Prods. 1994), Dante Hicks (played by Brian O’Halloran) and Randal Graves (played 
by Jeff Anderson) discuss the implications of independent contractors that were killed with 
the destruction of the second Star Wars Death Star.  Randal claimed that “any independent 
contractors who were working on the uncompleted Death Star were innocent victims when it 
was destroyed by the Rebels.”  CLERKS (View Askew Prods. 1994).  A roofer butts into the 
conversation, retorting that “any contractor working on that Death Star knew the risk 
involved.  If they got killed, it’s their own fault.”  Id.  
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My army is “volunteer,” your army is “professional,” and the 
enemy’s army is “mercenary.”  All these three words mean exactly 
the same thing.  I am a volunteer professor, I am a mercenary 
professor, and I am a professional professor.  And all you people 
around here are mercenary professional people.  . . .  It’s . . . a 
puzzle . . . why people should think that . . . “mercenary” somehow 
has a negative connotation.  I remind you . . . that . . . Adam Smith . 
. . said, “You do not owe your daily bread to the benevolence of the 
baker, but to his proper regard for his own interest.”  . . .  In fact, I 
think mercenary motives are among the least unattractive that we 
have.172 
Regardless of whether the public values the loss of a military or 
contractor life differently, there can be no question that, currently, the 
public receives far more accessible, current, accurate, and compelling 
information on military deaths than it receives on contractor fatalities.  This 
means the public is not receiving a full accounting.  Accordingly: 
The central effect of relying on [contractors] is to reduce the 
public’s knowledge about a portion of the war’s casualties. . . . An 
individual death evokes sympathy – and a sense that the 
government is responsible for it – regardless of whether the person 
who died is a soldier or a contractor. . . . These findings suggest the 
need to reconsider the relationship between citizenship, public 
consent, and the human cost of war.173 
The public cannot be expected to make a fully informed decision 
without full access to complete information.  Encouraging transparency to 
increase public awareness of the role that contractors currently play on the 
battlefield is a task that desperately needs to be undertaken by our political 
leaders.174 
CONCLUSION 
An honest, accurate tally of the human toll of military conflicts plays a 
critical role in a representative democracy.  Yet the public, the media, and 
American policy-makers currently lack relevant, accurate data.  The 
pervasive deployment of contractors on the modern battlefield requires the 
injection of contractor deaths into the casualty sensitivity equation.  
 
 172. THE DRAFT: A HANDBOOK OF FACTS AND ALTERNATIVES 366 (Sol Tax ed., 
University of Chicago Press 1976). 
 173. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 260. 
 174. Id. at 261 (“The public cannot be said to have consented to something that it does 
not know about.”). 
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Although research conducted by CRS and GAO has increased insight into 
this complicated analysis, much work remains.  Congress must 
affirmatively take cognizance of the issue.  We also encourage DoD to 
foster discussion and thinking about these issues at its senior service 
schools, and to fund both empirical and survey research inside and outside 
of the government. 
We think it perhaps most important to encourage the media to report 
responsibly on the true human costs of the government’s contemporary 
military actions.175  This tally, particularly to the extent that it proves 
inconsistent with conventional wisdom, is important for the public – and 
Congress – to grasp, in order to understand both the level of the military’s 
reliance on contractors and the extent of contractor sacrifice.  Increasingly, 
contractors make the ultimate sacrifice, and that sacrifice merits respect and 
gratitude.  Ultimately, the public weighs the intangible benefits of achieving 
foreign policy objectives against the most tangible costs imaginable – the 
lives of those sacrificed to achieve those objectives.176  In weighing that 
balance, all lives must be counted. 
 
 
 175. The media’s failure to force contractor deaths more clearly into the public 
consciousness appears similar (and equally inexplicable) to its failure to aggressively seek 
and publish military casket photos.  Generations of Americans were exposed to the harsh 
realities of armed combat by stark images – in newspapers and on television screens – of 
flag-draped coffins.  But the exposure ceased during much of the last decade, until President 
Obama lifted the ban on such images in 2009.  Although the policy banning media access to 
Dover Air Force Base dated back to 1991, its ramifications were not as significant until the 
“global war on terror” commenced. Professor Ralph Begleiter successfully sued the DoD in 
2004 under the FOIA to gain access to government photographs of the Honor Guard and 
subsequently posted them on the web through the National Security Archive at George 
Washington University.  The ban, however, effectively continued because, as Thomas 
Blanton, Director of the National Security Archive, and Begleiter suggest, the litigation 
prompted the Pentagon to stop photographing the ceremonies.  See, e.g., Return of the 
Fallen, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 152 (April 28, 2005), 
available at  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB152/index.htm (quoting 
Begleiter as he lamented that “[h]iding these images from the public – or, worse, failing even 
to record these respectful moments – deprives all Americans of the opportunity to recognize 
their contribution to our democracy, and hinders policymakers and historians in the future 
from making informed judgments about public opinion and war.”). 
 176. Contrast this with Larson’s conclusion: “When asked to support a military 
operation, the American public ultimately must weigh the intangible benefits of achieving 
foreign policy objectives against the most tangible costs imaginable – the lives of U.S. 
service personnel.”  LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 99 (emphasis 
added).  Such a conclusion no longer reflects the realities of the modern battlefield. 
